Mountain Warfare in Civilised Countries

(d) Columns should use enveloping tactics within a radius varying with their strength. Weak forces operating within a small radius may not materially affect the issue of the engagement; while strong forces moving in too wide an arc will advance but slowly, leaving the enemy time to counter the threat. (e) The choice of objectives for the columns must be ruled by the terrain, on the principle that the arrival at each objective should facili tate the attack on those that follow. (f) Surprise has always de cisive results, because the victim is pinned to the terrain. Every effort should be made to achieve this under cover of night, fog and bad weather. The capture of Monte Nero (middle Isonzo, June 1915) by an Italian Alpine battalion was an admirable in stance of a night surprise. A surprise attack is favoured by the use, even if only by small detachments, of routes held to be im practicable. It must, however, be remembered that in mountain warfare the would-be surpriser may himself be surprised, and no precaution against this contingency should be neglected.

(g) The existence of local reserves does not dispense with the formation of a general reserve. The commander must decide whether to despatch it by an independent route or whether, in view of the broken character of the terrain, to make it follow the principal column. In deciding, he must remember that in moun tain warfare an extended front means a shallower line, and that delay in the arrival of reserves may have very serious conse quences. Local reconnaissance should be carried out by special infantry units pushed far forward from their base. Mountainous country involves reconnaissance along independent lines. One large body sending out patrols in various directions is an unsuit able arrangement ; separate duties should from the outset be allotted to units according to circumstances, each unit being given freedom of action. The advance should be made by bounds. The method of approach should be : first, taking advantage of all communications that can be utilised ; then, following the ridges, which give a commanding position and allow of deployment on less steep ground. Night marches are often unavoidable. The attack is always slow and difficult, and must be developed syste matically. The more broken and uneven the ground, the greater the importance of the manoeuvre even of minor units.

In open country every inch of dead ground must be utilised, suitable formations adopted, and constant support given by ar tillery and machine-gun fire. Artillery can often support infantry up to the moment of the assault, while machine-guns can fire over the infantry's heads. In close country, where little artillery sup port is available, infantry can gain their best results by infiltra tion, systematically supported by their own arms.

As a rule the highest axes should be followed, for the sake of the better possibilities of manoeuvring afforded by a command ing position. Reserve units can almost always be concentrated

under cover at a short distance from the forward troops. The bet ter method of exploiting a success is to push the advance towards the enemy's communications, not to widen the breach. The nature of the engagement and the terrain make it impossible to support the advance with direct artillery fire, which ties the in fantry down to a prearranged timetable. On the other hand, since the terrain localises the defence on certain obvious lines, a lifting barrage, the movement of which will be regulated by the infantry, is suitable. Containing actions are always of great value. Tanks can operate in the valleys, on broad passes, and on plateaux, but cannot as yet be used on a large scale.

Defensive.

The positions available permit of effectual re sistance, but few are immune from the defect of shallowness, which limits the elasticity of the defence by making the same units responsible for observation and action. Preference should be given to positions which are difficult to outflank and command numerous approaches on a narrow front. In disposing forces it should be remembered that routes regarded as inaccessible are often the most dangerous. The crest of a ridge may be defended on the crest itself, or in front, or behind. Defence on the crest abandons good positions to the attack, offers much dead ground, but affords easy communication with the rear and good cover for reinforcements and reserves. Defence in front of the crest is much exposed to observation, and communications with the rear are difficult ; but better observation is possible and there is less dead ground. Defence behind the crest has the quality of offer ing slight visibility. In practice it is best to seek a solution com bining the advantages of all three and avoiding their defects, particularly that of shallowness. It will often be found advisable to establish advanced centres of resistance.

To defend a pass occupy the depression and the heights that command it; secure converging fire on the depression; keep re serves on the flanks, towards the heights. If the pass is long, organise several lines of defence; if narrow, command the outlet from positions in the rear. To defend the head of a valley occupy in force the branches forming it; obtain converging fire on the centre of the depression, pushing forward the wings of the posi tion. It is of the greatest importance that machine-gun and ar tillery fire should be directed in front of the position so as to avoid dead ground. Prompt counter-attacks are most effective, and should be made as the attacking force is about to reach the top of the slope. Local reserves are useful, and the terrain gen erally allows of their being kept under cover not far from the position.