It is frequently necessary to raid and destroy villages in order to induce the enemy to stand and fight. Such raids need careful organisation in order to insure that the work is efficiently done in the time available. Raids are usually carried out in various direc tions, radially, from some semi-permanent camp, the force going out early and returning to camp before dark. The retirement is almost always followed up, and it is in harrying a retirement that the enemy is most dangerous. A running fight (with all its dis advantages) is unavoidable, because the enemy has no columns or guns moving on a road to deploy, but merely follows up deployed. The art of conducting such a retirement consists in the careful and timely laying out of troops in successive positions, so that the retreat of the rearmost is always efficiently covered, and in the skilful co-operation of fighting aeroplanes.
For the defence of the line of communication the system is a chain of piquets in assault proof posts dominating the route. These posts, often 2,000 ft. above the valley, have to be strongly built of dry stone, wired, and the garrisons supplied with food and water for (say) io days. It is obvious that the work involved is laborious. At suitable intervals on the line of communica tion larger posts are established capable of accommodating the convoys passing through. These posts also contain the mobile reserve for their section of the line of communication.
An Example.--Perhaps a small example will best illustrate the difficulties which beset a commander in mountain warfare. A force of four battalions (and attached troops) camps for the night. It is found necessary to use one company per battalion for camp piquets. Next morning the advance continues, but owing to the necessity for an early start it is impossible to relieve the piquets before moving. They must be withdrawn by the rear
guard and rejoin units later. So the advance begins with all bat talions only three companies strong. "A" battalion gives two companies as advanced guard, one available for piqueting. "B" is allotted entirely for piqueting. "C" heads the main body. "D" finds two companies for rearguard and one as baggage escort. In the advance it is found that piqueting is heavy, that an average of a company to a mile is needed. The force advances four miles (which means that the remaining company of "A" and all "B"‘ battalion are used up on piquet) and is confronted by 1,50o enemy in position. In theory, a brigade is confronted by 1,500 men. In practice 1,5oo men are being faced by the two advanced guard companies and the three companies of "C" battalion, per haps actually some 500 or 600 in all ; for that is all that the com mander has immediately available. The above crude example is typical of the dispersion of resources inherent in mountain warfare.
As regards mountain warfare in general, history appears to point to two main lessons: firstly, that the true subjection of moun taineers can only be arrived at by opening up and developing the country. Short of that, they may be overawed and pacified for a time, but a change in the undeveloped and individualistic conditions of life is essential to their permanent pacification. Secondly, that if the operations for their primary subjugation are to be quickly and successfully carried out, the forces engaged must be definitely trained to the task, and the personnel com posing the force should, as far as possible, be composed of men bred in mountains. (J. P. V.-S.)