MOUNTAIN WARFARE IN COUNTRIES The inhabitants of this area possess all the characteristics noted above. As regards supply during operations, they normally carry seven to io days' food on them, and consequently are un troubled by anxiety about their line of communication. They are armed only with rifles and knives. But the rifles are modern for the most part ; and it is for consideration whether the power of mobility conferred by such an armament and supply system does not largely compensate for the absence of artillery and other arms. A commander entrusted with the subjugation of a frontier tribe has a difficult task before him. It may be possible to overawe the tribe by air action alone. But targets for aerial attack are limited in such a form of society, and if the opposition of the tribe be determined, air action alone, will seldom suffice; an advance over the ground will, as a rule, be necessary.
Planning the Campaign.—The first difficulty is to select the objective. It can be said at once that the true objective is to bring the enemy to battle. But how is it to be done? Owing to absence of lines of communication, the enemy's strategical mo bility is always superior. Owing to his upbringing, his tactical mobility is also superior, except against the best hill troops. Normally, a threat against an enemy's capital forces him to inter pose, and brings on a battle. Here, the enemy may not consider any of his hamlets worth defending resolutely. He may prefer to adopt a purely guerrilla attitude, to be ubiquitous, and to worry the advance. That is the most difficult problem to deal with. As a rule he is ready to oppose an advance with resolution in measure as his hopes stand high. If defeated, he tends towards more guerrilla methods. A commander therefore has usually to select the line of advance most likely to produce massed resistance. In doing so he can advance as one column, or by several columns up several valleys. The first method has the advantage of simplicity and of inviting the enemy to concentrate. But the larger the force on one track the slower the movement, and so, if the enemy seeks to avoid decisive battle, the less hope there is of achieving it. A move
in several columns has the advantage of speed, and gives greater hope of cornering an elusive enemy. But it involves a series of lines of communication, and is attended by all the difficulties of co-operation and mutual support between columns when separated by mountain ranges.
Progress of Operations.—Whatever the plan the method of conducting operations follows a fairly uniform course. The force advances up a valley protected by a strong advanced guard. This advanced guard throws out detachments to seize and hold tactical points on the hills flanking the valley, and so securing the advance of the column below. These detachments (or "piquets") are withdrawn by the rear guard when the column has passed. Since all commanding ground within rifle range must be denied to the enemy, it is clear that piquets often have to establish them selves 2,000 yd. from the column, and to climb i,000 ft. or more. The process is therefore laborious and slow, and limits the length of march possible in a day.
Defence at Night.—For the night, all-round defence is essen tial against so ubiquitous an enemy. Arrangements therefore take the form of a central camp, protected by self-contained piquets posted on tactical points round the camp. These piquets must be sufficient in number, and be placed far enough out, to prevent the enemy firing into camp at night. But since complete pro tection against such sniping is impossible, a considerable amount of protection against fire has to be provided within the camp. The camp itself has also to be designed and organised to resist assault. It will be realised that there is, in consequence, an im mense amount of heavy work to carry out at the end of an exhaust ing day's advance. Moreover, it is of primary importance that all movement shall have ceased and the camp be made entirely se cure before dark. Because, though (as stated above) organised night operations frequently prove successful, unorganised move ments are disastrous in face of a ubiquitous enemy who holds the initiative.