After three hours of violent artillery preparation, the American I. army advanced at 5:3o A.M. on Sept. 26, between the Meuse river and the Argonne Forest inclusive with Montfaucon-Ro magne-Buzancy as the axis of attack. During the first two days a steady advance was made except at Montfaucon, which the Ger man stubbornly held until the second day and thus gained time for the arrival of reserves. By the 28th, the German had been driven back I I km., when his reinforcements of eight divisions and considerable artillery and aviation launched strong counter attacks which maintained intact his main Hindenburg position. Cross and flanking fire from the Cotes de Meuse and the Argonne Forest, coupled with severe fighting during the inclement weather after the 27th, inflicted heavy losses necessitating the relief of three American divisions which were experiencing their first battle. While all except a few heavy guns had passed "no man's" land by the 2 7th, supply and evacuation were difficult through the deep shell-battered zone over the four partially destroyed roads avail able. The attack of the French IV. Army in the Champagne made such slight progress that the American commander-in-chief granted Marshal Foch's request for two of his needed divisions as rein forcements to that army, desiring its early advance to assist in "pinching out" the Argonne Forest.
Having driven a salient into the centre of the enemy's defensive zone, the Americans with the three fresh divisions proceeded on Oct. 4 to outflank the Argonne Forest and COtes de Meuse north of Verdun. After the 1st division had captured Fleville, the I. Corps, crossing the Aire river on the night of Oct. 6-7, assaulted the Argonne heights about Cornay. Severe fighting drove the Germans from the forest into Grandpre by the loth. The French IV. Army on the west then advanced to the line of the Aisne river. In the attack against the Cotes de Meuse on Oct. 8, the enemy lost several important observation and artillery stations and over 3,00o prisoners.
With the danger of flanking fire reduced by these operations, the Americans in the centre again assaulted the vital Romagne heights which commanded the approaches to the Hindenburg line. By Oct. 16, Cote Dame Marie had been captured and the last organized defensive position in this vital area penetrated. By the end of October, the whole army had gained a footing in this posi tion and the penetration at Grandpre and in the centre at Romagne heights had been complete. In the meanwhile, the French IV. Army made several unsuccessful attempts to cross the Aisne river west of the Bois de Bourgogne.
These American successes confirmed the judgment of the American commander-in-chief in declining Marshal Foch's pro posal to limit the American I. Army to the Meuse valley and to create a new army (French-American) under French command to operate on both flanks of the Argonne. The American fighting had been incessant, day and night, the weather trying and replacements scarce. Artillery, tanks and transportation were inadequate and gas ammunition extremely short. However, the fortitude, re sourcefulness and leadership of this newly organized army insured success. In a month's combat it had advanced 21 km., reducing four German positions and capturing over 18,00o prisoners, 37o cannon, r,000 machine guns, and had forced the Germans to em ploy 31 divisions, including their last reserves. The strain on the German was calamitous and his morale was reaching the breaking point. The critical aspect of the situation was depicted by Gen.
Von der Marwitz's declaration to his command about this time: . . . "The heaviest part of the task will thus fall on the V. Army . . . and the safety of the Fatherland will be in its hands. It is on the firm resistance of the Verdun front that depends the fate of a great part of the Western Front, perhaps even of our nation. . . ." Hindenburg in his memoirs added : "It was plain that this situation could not last. . . . Moreover the pressure which the American masses were putting upon our sensitive points in the region of the Meuse was too strong." Preparing for an easterly advance the American commander in-chief created a second army, placing Lt.-Gen. Hunter Liggett in command of I. Army on Oct. 16, and Lt.-Gen. Robert L. Bul lard over the II. Army on the St. Mihiel front, himself retaining personal direction of this army group. While the I. Army con tinued its advance north and east, the II. Army was in readiness to move toward Briey.
For the first time the I. Army was able to prepare for its next general attack under normal conditions. Practically all its auxili aries were now manned by Americans, and a new front with its manifold installations and services did not have to be created. Experience had welded the Army into an effective team with decisive striking power. Concentrating artillery and its aerial bombing in support of its V. Corps (centre), the I. Army, on Nov. I, 1918, broke through the German defences to the north-east of Buzancy, the 2nd Division, advancing nearly 9 km. The Ger mans were demoralized. On Nov. 2, the I. Corps on the left of the army pursued the enemy beyond Boult-aux-Bois clearing a passage of the Aisne River for the French IV. Army, while the centre and right carried the heights of Barricourt. By a night advance on Nov. 2-3 the approaches to Beaumont were cleared and the German Army between the Meuse and Bar Rivers was in full retreat. The following day the advance continued to the line of the Meuse capturing the heights commanding Sedan during the night of Nov. 6-7. With the German supply line (Carignan—Sedan) under heavy artillery fire by Nov. 3, the III. Corps (right) by a brilliant operation forced a crossing of the Meuse south of Dun sur-Meuse and in conjunction with troops east of the Meuse cleared the northern slopes of the COtes de Meuse by Nov. 7. Pursuant to Marshal Foch's instructions of Nov. 9 the advance continued to positions commanding the Chiers river, east of Stenay. Only the Armistice saved the German V. Army from complete destruction. American tactics and the American com mander-in-chief's firm adherence to open warfare-training, the value of the rifle and bayonet and the possibilities of the offensive were justified by the brilliant successes in these operations.
With the capture of Cote Dame Marie on Oct. 16, the American I. Army penetrated defences covering the vital German supply lines and jeopardized a successful retreat of the German Army in the northern part of the western front. The Germans employed over one fourth of their divisional strength to meet the American attack, i.e., 47 Divisions west and 15 Divisions east of the Meuse river. The American I. Army employed 31 Divisions (24 American and 7 French) on the whole front with a total ration strength in Oct. of 1,031,000. The Americans captured 26,000 prisoners, 847 cannon, 3,00o machine guns and large quantities of material and suffered 117,000 killed and wounded. (J. J. P.)