OPERATION. On Sept. 2, 1918, ten days before the St. Mihiel Battle in the World War, and during the concentration of troops therefor, an agreement was reached that the American I. army should attack on the Meuse Argonne front immediately after the completion of the St. Mihiel operation. Marshal Foch had proposed the assignment of Ameri can divisions to the French II. and IV. armies, but as the Ameri can commander-in-chief, Gen. Pershing, adhered to his purpose of employing the main part of the American troops as an integral army unit.
This American operation, supported on the west by the French IV. Army, was strategically associated with the British-French St. Quentin-Cambrai attack and the combined Allied Ypres attack. The conception underlying these simultaneous offensives was to force such dispersion of the enemy reserves as to weaken his defence generally, or compel such concentration at vital points as would jeopardize other parts of his line. The vital portion of the German front was astride the Meuse river because, here, his main supply artery (Carignan-Sedan-Mezieres), traversing the diffi cult Ardennes forest, was closest to the battle line. Withdrawals were accepted on all fronts except the Meuse-Argonne.
While the ultimate objective of the Meuse-Argonne operation was the severance of the German lines of supply, the immediate purpose was the reduction of the fortified area embraced by the Meuse river—Argonne forest and Hindenburg position extending from Brieulles through Romagne to Grandpre. The French high command hardly expected even this result before winter. The region was ideal for defence, commanded on the east by the Cotes de Meuse and west by the Argonne Forest and dominated in the centre by the heights of Montfaucon, Vauquois, Romagne, Bour gogne and Barricourt. With four successive positions, linked to gether by numerous interlocking strong points and machine gun emplacements, the defence was continuous for the whole area. Four years of occupation had created a zone 22 km. in depth of
defensive strength unsurpassed on the western front. A possi bility of ending the war in 1918 and full confidence in the fighting qualities of his troops, prompted the American commander-in chief to risk his partially trained army in this difficult operation. In two weeks, this army was to reduce the St. Mihiel salient, change to a front about 1 oo km. distant and attack the fortified Meuse-Argonne zone, a task without parallel in the World War.
On Sept. 22, 1918, the American I. Army, Gen. Pershing com manding, took over the entire front from the Moselle river via Verdun to include Argonne Forest at La Harazee. The command embraced the XVII. French Corps and three French divisions north of Verdun. Maintaining a defensive attitude on the new St. Mihiel front with two army corps, the II. and IV., and eight di visions, and an aggressive defence about Verdun with one army corps and three divisions, all available units were assembled for the decisive attack west of the Meuse river by Sept. 25, 1918. The forces consisted of three army corps, the I., V. and III., 15 di visions (9 in front line and 6 in reserve), nearly 2,800 cannon, over Boo aeroplanes, about i8o tanks and necessary munitions, supplies and hospitals, some of the artillery, aviation, tanks and services coming from the French. This concentration, increasing to over 1,000,000 men in October, was accomplished by night movements over limited communications during and immediately after the St. Mihiel battle in less than three weeks. American feints and ruses east of the Meuse and Moselle rivers led the Germans to expect an extension of the St. Mihiel operation so that the attack was almost a complete surprise. At this time the Germans had in line, Gen. Von Gallwitz's Detachment C, io Divisions at St. Mihiel front ; Gen. Von der Marwitz's V. Army, eight Divisions, astride the Meuse river, and part of the Crown Prince's III. Army, three Divisions, astride the Aire river and the Argonne Forest.