The British Advance up the Tigris

THE BRITISH ADVANCE UP THE TIGRIS During the latter part of April the Turks showed a marked increase of activity; but all their offensive efforts were frustrated, and Nixon, encouraged by these successes, decided to occupy Imara, 6om. north of Al Qurna on the Tigris. The task was entrusted to Townshend, who carried it out by making free use of water transport for moving his troops, and who made himself master of the place on June 3, capturing 17 guns and 1,800 prisoners. Nixon now resolved on a blow against An Nasiriya, on the Euphrates, and the I2th Div. took possession of that town on July 25, capturing another 17 guns and i,000 prisoners. The expeditionary force could then claim that it had effectually achieved the original object of the campaign.

Occupation of Kut.

The authorities at Simla accepted Nixon's proposal to advance up the Tigris to Kut al 'Amara i8om. into the heart of the enemy's country—and early in August Townshend, with the 6th Div., began pushing forward from 'Amara. On Sept. 15 he drove an advanced Turkish force out of a position on the right bank of the Tigris about 15m. from Kut, and on the 28th completely defeated the enemy a little farther on at Es Sinn, taking 1,65o prisoners, 13 guns, and much war material Kut was occupied, and the cavalry pursued the fleeing Osmanlis as far as Al 'Aziziya, half way to Baghdad.

Kut was a place of strategical importance, because at this point the Shatt al Hai, issuing from the Tigris, created a link with the Euphrates near An Nasiriya and provided the line of com munications which would naturally connect Turkish forces on the lower Euphrates with Baghdad. It was furthermore the most populous spot between 'Amara and An Nasiriya on the one hand and Baghdad on the other.

The idea of pushing on as far as Baghdad had already taken shape even before the occupation of Kut. The August discom fiture in the Gallipoli Peninsula (see DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN), coupled with a belated realization that the Dardanelles venture would not succeed, had rendered the British Government eager for some dramatic achievement in Mesopotamia. The Indian

Viceroy had advocated an advance on Baghdad when the start up the Tigris from 'Amara was materialising, and Townshend's triumph acted as a powerful stimulus to such aspirations. Nixon intimated early in October that he could open a road to Baghdad, under the circumstances then existing, but could not hold the city if it were taken. The military authorities at home, while admitting the possibility of capture, regarded permanent reten tion as out of the question with the limited numbers available, and they declared that if the place was to be held Nixon must be reinforced by two divisions. But, influenced by political con siderations, the Government became insistent. Nixon was told on Oct. 31 that he might advance on the city.

First Baghdad Offensive Fails.

Townshend was unable to begin his advance for a fortnight, even after receiving the order to advance, owing to shortness of supplies and the need of or ganization for the hazardous effort. He advanced from Al 'Aziziya on Nov. II, and on approaching Ctesiphon some days later he found the Turks to be assembled there in strong force and expecting reinforcements. He attacked them on the 21st and was at first successful; but additional Ottoman troops arrived during the fight and recovered much of the lost ground, Town shend's losses in the action proved very heavy and on the night of the 25th he moved off. He halted on the 29th. Next day the pursuing Turks came up and delivered a resolute attack, which was, however, beaten off, and after that the sorely tried little Anglo-Indian army was not seriously interfered with on its way to Kut, which was reached on Dec. 3. So, for the moment, ended the ill-advised Baghdad adventure.