The Siege of Kut

THE SIEGE OF KUT With the approval of the Home and Indian Governments, Nixon decided that Townshend was to remain where he was, although if he did so he was bound to be invested. They assumed, too readily, that he would be relieved before his supplies ran out. By Dec. 8 Kut was hemmed in on all sides. Its situation, in a deep loop on the left bank of the Tigris, rendered the place readily defensible against assault or siege approach, and the German Field-Marshal von der Goltz, who had just taken supreme command of the Ottoman forces in Mesopotamia, realized that unless it fell to an early assault the main Turkish task in this region would be to guard against a relief. Nur-ed-Din, the Turk ish commander on the spot, had four divisions at his disposal, and on Dec. so, 1I, and 12 he delivered unavailing onsets upon the narrow front that was not covered by the river. After that the siege became a blockade, part of Nur-ed-Din's troops moved down the river some distance so as to confront any relieving force that might try to approach, and fortifications were erected.

Attempts at Relief.—Meanwhile the 7th and 3rd Indian Divisions had been detached from the Western Front in Europe, and began arriving in the middle of December in the Shatt al 'Arab. Gen. Aylmer took charge of the troops who were to undertake the relief of Kut, and units as they disembarked were pushed on to 'Amara with all speed and proceeded thence up the Tigris. In spite of a lack of artillery the Turks were driven out of their advanced position at 'Ali Gharbi, were again defeated at Shaikh Sa'ad and, after a further defeat, fell back to the lines of Umm al Hanna, 20M. from Kut on the left bank of the Tigris. When on Jan. 21 the relieving force essayed the storming of the Umm al Hanna position the effort failed and so numerous were the casualties that Aylmer felt compelled to pause in his offensive and to await reinforcements. About the same date Sir P. Lake suc ceeded Sir J. Nixon in the chief command.

Improvement of Organization.

Lake set himself to place Aylmer's line of communication on a better footing, to improve the medical arrangements, and to develop the wharves at Al Qurna and Basra. Material of all kinds was, however, deficient, and the Turks were in the meantime developing their lines of defence on both banks of the Tigris below Kut, rendering the task of a relieving force more and more difficult. The British

Government had, on receipt of the bad news about Umm al Hanna, ordered the 13th Div. to proceed from Egypt to Mesopo tamia; but to move these troops from Suez to the front of the Tigris necessarily took some weeks. Aylmer attempted no for ward movement during February, but on the night of March 7-8, without waiting for the 13th Div., he advanced from near Shaikh Sa'ad against the Es Sinn position, intending a surprise.

This was on the right bank of the Tigris, less than 1 om. from Kut, considerably higher up than Umm al Hanna and the defile caused by the Suwaiqiya marshes on the farther bank; but owing to the Turks holding that defile Aylmer's flotilla was prevented advancing above Umm al Hanna. When the assailants advanced against the reinforced Turks, they were beaten back and had to retire to Shaikh Sa'ad.

Surrender of Kut.

The garrison of Kut was already on much reduced rations; but Gen. Gorringe, who had succeeded Aylmer, could make no fresh attempt for nearly a month owing to trans port and supply problems. On April 5, however, the 13th Div., under Gen. Maude stormed the Hanna lines and penetrated well into the defile on the left bank of the Tigris; but, when first the 7th Div. and then the 13th Div. attacked the Sanniyat lines at its farther end, they were in each case repulsed. A final effort was made by the 7th Div. on the 22nd against Sanniyat, which nearly succeeded. Finally, on the night of the 24th, a steamer loaded with provisions tried to run the blockade but failed, and on the 29th Kut, with its garrison of 9,00o British and Indian troops, surrendered. The efforts to save it had cost 24,00o casualties.

British Opinions.

A Royal Commission was set up a few months later to enquire into the operations that had taken place in Mesopotamia, and its conclusions were to the effect that the undertaking of a campaign on so ambitious a scale without adequate forethought and efficient preparations was worthy of blame ; it also animadverted in strong terms on the very unsatis factory character of the medical arrangements during the early stages of the venture.