in the Franco-German War Battles Around Metz

Then followed a duel—the one great cavalry duel of the war— between upwards of two thousand horsemen a side. But it was delivered by both sides in a series of regimental charges, and was singularly indecisive. For about half an hour great crowds of riders, hidden by dense clouds of dust, drifted aimlessly about the plain, till at length the charge of a single squadron delivered on the outer French flank, brought the whole mass into motion north eastward, and, both sides sounding the rally, the engagement gradually ceased. It was now about 7 P.M. and night was coming on. 'Seeing the dust-clouds drifting away northward, and noting the lethargy which seemed to have settled over the whole French line, Prince Frederick Charles decided to assert his own independ ent will to conquer by a final assault along his whole front. Guns, cavalry, infantry, everything that could still stand were to take part in it. But the troops soon lost direction in the smoke dusk and became involved in the direst confusion ; and exhaustion put an end to the Prussian advance.

Thus closed the hardest fought battle of the Franco-German War. From 9 A.M. to 3 P.M. only 23,700 rifles, 8,1oo sabres and 126 guns had been brought into action by the Germans against 59,100 rifles, 6,700 sabres, and 30o guns on the French side, and even at the close of the day the former had only deployed 47,10o rifles, 8,30o sabres and 222 guns against 83,00o rifles, 8,000 sabres and 432 guns including 24 mitrailleuses. The chief characteristic of the day's fighting was the terrible effectiveness of the Prussian artillery, which was handled in masses and not, as on the French side, by batteries. The latter arriving singly on the field, were quickly reduced to silence. Deprived of their support, the gallant counter-attacks of the French infantry were repeatedly shattered, after rolling back the opposing infantry. As for the cavalry, on both sides, although they several times intervened to avert a menace, they proved altogether incapable of affecting the decision.

Gravelotte–St. Privat (August 18).

The position on to which the French army fell back from the field of Vionville is formed by a ridge some six miles long running from Rozerieulles almost due north to Roncourt, and connected with the general plateau between the Meuse and Moselle by a gentle saddle run ning from Amanvillers west towards Doncourt. North of this saddle the slopes are passable by troops of all arms in close order. To the south the rivulet of the Mance forms a formidable obstacle. Scrub and woods with dense undergrowth line both its banks, and, except by the great chaussee from Metz to Verdun, access to the French side becomes impossible to troops in ordered bodies. It does not appear that the position had been systematically exam ined or apportioned to the several corps. The army merely swung backwards, pivoting on its left wing. No lines of march were assigned to the several units, consequently the confusion became great; and, arriving late, many of them had so little idea of the general situation that they actually placed outposts to the north and east, whilst the whole enemy army lay south and west.

Fortunately for the French the Germans were too exhausted by the battle of the 16th to attempt to interfere with these move ments. At daybreak on the 18th the royal headquarters (which now for the first time arrived at the front) still had no certain knowledge as to whether the French main army was in retreat, or in a position for a fight. Hence the orders issued overnight on the presumption that the main force of the French was retreating to the north and west were allowed to stand, and the whole II. Army (Prince Frederick Charles) moved off in echelon from left to right, the I. Army under Steinmetz, being left in observation of the troops visible on their front and of the garrison of Metz itself. And it had only the VII. Corps immediately available if the enemy counter-attacked. But Steinmetz had not ordered, nor had Zast row, the corps commander, undertaken any preparations to meet an emergency. About io A.M. the corps of the II. Army had reached the following positions : VIII. Corps, Rezonville ; IX. near St. Marcel; Guard approaching Doncourt ; XII. towards Jarny ; the III. and X. still in their bivouacs preparing to move. The cavalry of the Saxons had established the fact that the French had not retreated northward, but though scouts from the Guard had already seen the enemy on the heights of St. Privat, this information had not yet reached headquarters, nor had it been transmitted to the IX. Corps, which it most closely concerned.

Shortly after 1 o A.M. Moltke, still under the impression that the French right extended no farther than La Folie (2m. north of the Metz road), determined to attack with the IX. and VIII. Corps whilst the Guard executed a turning movement via Habonville against the French right. The IX. Corps was to engage, but not to push its attack home until the Guard could co-operate. The XII. Corps was left to its own devices, but fortunately the crown prince of Saxony, who commanded it, had ridden forward and, seeing the French force towards Roncourt, had issued orders which in the event proved decisive. In pursuance of his instructions Manstein, commanding the IX. Corps, set his two divisions in motion towards La Folie and the Bois de la Cusse, and advanced to reconnoitre the French position. Suddenly coming in sight of the camp of a whole French corps (the 4th), he decided to execute an artillery surprise on a grand scale. At noon, just as the French infantry were falling in for midday roll-call, sufficient guns were in position, and suddenly opened fire. But the effect was disap pointing. The French infantry ran to their arms, and moved for ward to attack, while their artillery also took up the challenge, and from the heights near St. Privat the 6th Corps, whose pres ence was unsuspected by the Prussians, joined in. The batteries on the extreme Prussian left were saved by the timely arrival of companies of Hessian infantry. An obstinate fight ensued.