Bazaine, however, withdrew entirely under cover of the forts, and set about the reorganisation of his troops in the most leisurely manner. The Metz forts, though insufficiently armed and some incomplete, were nevertheless too formidable for any field army to attempt without the aid of a powerful siege train, which for the moment was not available. Hence the Germans decided from the first to reduce the place by hunger, calculating that with the extra 150,000 men thrown back upon the fortress, its food supplies could not last very long. On the morning of the 59th the German army was far too exhausted for further efforts. In the course of the afternoon the royal headquarters, creating a new army under the crown prince of Saxony for field operations towards the Meuse, assigned the remainder of the II. Army, and the whole of the I. Army to Prince Frederick Charles as commander-in-chief of the army of investment. Steinmetz was shortly afterwards re lieved of his command and returned to Germany. This brought the strength of his command to eight corps, numbering some 220,000 men; an enormous mass to feed.
For the moment the chief care of the Prince was to guard against an attempt of the French army to break out to the west ward. The encircling positions were fortified with a light outpost line, behind which was drawn a main position on which every art of the engineer was expended. The water-supply of the town was promptly interrupted, but the river water was quite drinkable.
Meanwhile the French in Metz had been diligently at work. There was no real deficiency of ammunition and stores in the fortress, and provisions for forty days were reported in hand. Bazaine issued orders for a break out to the northward by the right bank of the river, but at the last moment he wavered. Calling a council of war on the heights of Fort St. Julien, he asked the opinion of his subordinates, who were unanimously against the proposed sortie, principally because the artillery "had only ammunition enough for a single battle!" Besides, the Germans had long since become aware of the movement in progress, and all chance of surprise was past. It was also raining very heavily.
Accordingly the scheme was abandoned. On August 29 Bazaine, receiving word of Macmahon's move to his relief, determined to renew the attempt.
At this moment (Aug. 31) the positions of Manteuffel's com mand (I. Corps and 3rd Landwehr division) were most danger ously extended, and a surprise at daybreak might have had far reaching results. But the habit of excessive bugling and band playing betrayed the French design even before daybreak. This time he adhered to his decision, but the concentration was not complete until 1 :3o P.M., and not till 4 P.M. did the attack open (battle of Servigny or Noisseville) ; his opportunity had been allowed to slip, and though his first onset overwhelmed the German outposts, their main line held good, and masses of guns unlimber ing over a front of some 4m. rendered all further attempts to break the German cordon abortive. Next morning the fighting was renewed, but the whole French army was disheartened. It was obvious that what they had failed to do by surprise was hopeless now that twenty-four hours had been given in which the Germans could make counter-preparations. Therefore about noon a general retirement under the guns of the forts took place, and the last serious hope of the French army had vanished. Some 120,000 men with 528 guns had been engaged against 6o,000 Germans with 222 guns, and had been beaten off with a loss of 3,500 men. The Germans had lost about 3,000.
The investment now resumed its regular course, and as time wore on the conditions in Metz and the surrounding camps became deplorable. Towards the close of September rations had to be reduced, and the troops began slaughtering the cavalry horses for food. Probably to cheer the men by a semblance of activity Bazaine attempted a large sortie on Oct. 1 in the direction of Ladorchamps, and fighting continued into the 2nd, but without prospect of success, and the profound depression following on defeat sent up the sick list rapidly. One other sortie towards Noisseville followed on the 7th, but it was beaten off with the utmost ease by the investing troops, who were well fed and cared for. By this time even the gun-teams had followed the cavalry horses to the slaughter-house, so that the French as an army had ceased to exist. On the recognition of this fact nego tiations for capitulation were begun on Oct. 13, and on the 28th the Army of the Rhine surrendered. Had it held out even forty eight hours longer events before Paris and Orleans might have taken a different turn. The investment of Metz had lasted 54 days, and the death-roll of the civil population had risen to 3,587 against 1,200 in the corresponding period of a normal year. The army itself had only lost from sickness 2,600 men.