NAROCZ, BATTLE OF LAKE. Lake Narocz, in Poland, 62m. E.N.E. of Wilno (Vilna), gives its name to a great offensive by the Russian 2nd Army in the spring of 1916. (See WORLD WAR: Section vii. and MAP.) General Situation on the Eastern
river Pripet formed the dividing line between the German and Austrian commands. At the beginning of March there were 42 German and two Austrian divisions on the front north of the Pripet, the total length of which was about 25o miles. The Russians had organized their armies into three groups: the northern (12th and 5th Armies) on the Dvina, the western (1st, 2nd, loth, 4th and 3rd Armies) extending to south of the Pinsk marshes and the south western (8th, nth, 7th and 9th Armies) up to the Rumanian border. Their main strength was concentrated on the northern and western fronts, where it had been decided that the principal efforts of the year should be made.
The losses of 1915 in men and material had been made good; guns and munition were available on a larger scale than previously, though still insufficient for the requirements of trench warfare.
Plan of Operations.—The general idea of the battle was for the 2nd Army to attack on either side of Lake Narocz, where the German line formed a slight salient ; the two wings were eventually to join and to con tinue their advance westwards to Paneveiys (some 8om. N. of Wilno [Vilna] and loom. W. of the original line), where the 5th Army, which was to attack from the Jakobstadt bridgehead on the Dvina, was to join them. The operation seems to have been planned originally to take place later in the year, when all the Allies proposed to attack simul taneously. But on Feb. 21 the German assaults on Verdun began, and the Russians chivalrously hurried on their preparations and attacked to relieve the pressure on the French, at the worst pos sible time of the year—when the annual thaw, which renders all communications practically impossible for a period, might be expected at any moment.
Lake Narocz (8m. by 6m.) is the largest of a whole series of small lakes in which the tributaries of the Wilia and the Dzisna rise. It drains into the River Narocz, which flows south to join the Wilia east of Smorgonie. The greater part of the trench line between Dvinsk and Smorgonie (over loom. in a straight line) was protected by lake, stream or marsh, and stretches of dry ground wide enough for a large scale offensive were few. On either side of Lake Narocz, however, were gaps of four miles or so in the water line, where the terrain was comparatively favourable for attack, though communications were poor. The northern gap was ten miles to the north of Lake Narocz; the southern was between the lake itself and Lake Wisz niew.
The 2nd Army was divided into three groups: the right group (under Gen. Plyeshkov), opposite the northern gap, consisted of three corps and a cavalry corps; the centre group (under Gen. Sirelius), of two corps; and
the left group (under Gen. Baluev), of three corps. Four corps were available behind these groups to exploit any success gained. The right and left groups were to attack the north and south faces of the salient respectively, while the centre group assisted by minor assaults and demonstrations. The army commander, Smirnov, fell sick just before the battle and his place was taken by Gen. Ragoza.
The 2nd Army was opposed by Von Eichorn's loth Army on a front of some 85 miles, comprising 11 divisions and two cavalry divisions. The Germans were aware of the Russian concentration.
A thaw set in on March 17, but the offensive was nevertheless begun on the i8th. After a bombard ment of several hours, massed infantry attacks were made both by Plyeshkov's group north of Lake Narocz and by Baluev's group in the south. In the thickly wooded and enclosed terrain the in sufficiently trained Russian infantry soon lost cohesion, and their assaults were ill-timed and disjointed. Though the German first line trenches were in several cases occupied, they could not be held under the concentrated fire of the German artillery, which was ex tremely skilfully handled. By nightfall the Russians were back in their original positions, having suffered very heavy casualties without result. After two days of further artillery preparation and minor attacks intended to mislead the enemy, renewed heavy assaults were made on the nights of March 19-20 and
On Plyeshkov's front no ground was permanently gained in spite of terrible losses, but Baluev's group in the south made an advance of over a mile on a front of about 2 miles. The weather conditions were by now terrible; it thawed from the 17th to the 22nd, and the whole area of operations became a sea of mud. The battle was, however, continued till March 27, when the Rus sians at last desisted from their fruitless and costly attacks. In April a German counterstroke retook all the ground gained by Baluev. Meanwhile the attacks of the 5th Army from Jakobstadt, March
were equally unsuccessful and almost equally waste ful of life.
The operations resulted in a complete and disastrous failure for the Russians. Their losses were over 1oo,000 and they accomplished nothing. The offensive did not cause the Germans to move a single man from the Western Front, and so brought no relief to the French. Both time and place were ill-chosen; the staff work was bad; and the artillery, in spite of a greater concentration of heavy guns on a narrow front and a more liberal expenditure of ammunition than ever before, failed to give proper support to the infantry, who, as usual, paid the price in terrible losses. The result was, in fact, a bitter disillusionment to the Russian high command, to the Russian soldier and to the Russian people.