NEUVE CHAPELLE, BATTLE OF (March 10-13, 1915). Neuve Chapelle is a village in Pas de Calais west of Lille. Pop. 319 (1921). To understand the tactical idea upon which the battle of Neuve Chapelle was founded (the first of the siege war fare battles undertaken by the British army in France) it must be clearly kept in view that the British higher command had not grasped the fact that the war which now confronted them was an engineer-artillery war, and not a cavalry-infantry one. They con sidered that infantry could "open a door for an inroad of horse men against the enemy's rear," and in spite of the failure of Neuve Chapelle, this quite impossible idea governed the tactics of Sir John French and Sir Douglas Haig up to the end of the war.
Plan of
Feb. 12, General Haig recommended an offensive towards the Aubers ridge on a frontage of 2,000 yards between Port Arthur and the Moated Grange. Neuve Chapelle was to be the first objective, then a line east of the village, and finally the Aubers ridge, the occupation of which would threaten the enemy's communications between La Bassee and Lille. Sir John French, the commander-in-chief, approved of this plan, and fixed its date as soon after March 9 as weather would permit. The attack, or rather assault, was to be carried out by two corps, the Indian corps on the right and the IV. corps on the left. It was to be made after an intense artillery bombardment of 35 minutes' duration. Having broken the enemy's front, it was proposed to extend the attack to five miles in width, and so make room for the cavalry corps to pass through and pursue. The bombardment was to be carried out by 53o guns and howitzers, and the ammuni tion available was approximately 216,380 rounds.
4.30 A.M. the assaulting bat talions were in position. The morning was cold and misty, and visibility was bad. Sunrise was at 6.3o A.M., and exactly one hour later the general bombardment was opened. At 8.5 A.M. the attack was launched, and its first phase was carried out with considerable success. At 8.50 A.M. Neuve Chapelle was entered, but here the advance of the right was brought to a standstill by the British artillery barrage which had lifted, and was now falling between the village and the Bois de Biez. The first real trouble was experienced on the two flanks, on the right from the Bois de Biez, and on the left from Manquissart, from both of which a heavy fire was directed on the attackers rendering it impossible for them to extend their front rapidly. By 1 P.M. the whole of the first objec tive, except part of the Port Arthur salient, was in British hands. Then came a delay. Sir Douglas Haig proposed to advance on the Aubers ridge at 2 P.M., but this attack had to be postponed. This
enabled the Germans to push fqrward reserves to their second line position east of the village, which was only partially dug. From this line an effective cross fire was brought to bear on the north of Neuve Chapelle.
11.—During the night the Germans strengthened their new front line. The main attack was carried out by the IV. corps, and was directed on Aubers, the Indian Corps supporting it on the right. It was launched at 7 A.M., but was at once crushed by heavy machine gun fire opened from the concave position now held by the enemy. A little after noon the attack had to be abandoned. It was then clear that until the infantry assault could be prepared by an effective bombardment, to continue the action would lead to unprofitable slaughter.
At 5 A.M. on the 12th the Germans made a strong counter-attack which, however, failed in its ob ject. This was followed by an order from Sir Douglas Haig to con tinue the attack. It was ordered and then postponed with the inevitable confusion resulting. The IV. Corps was instructed to "push through the barrage of fire regardless of loss." The Bois de Biez was to be taken "at all costs." The 7th and 8th Divisions were to push on "regardless of the enemy's fire," with the in evitable result that hundreds of men were at once shot down. By nightfall it became obvious that the battle could not be continued, and early on the 13th Sir John French, having lost 12,892 officers and men, wired to Lord Kitchener : "Cessation of the forward movement is necessitated . . . above all by want of ammunition." Comments.—The true reason for the failure was lack of under standing. An attempt was made to attack a fortress as if it were a deployed army in the field. The conception of surprise was admirable, but it was useless to expect to capture the Aubers ridge from a frontage of 2,000 yards. To do so the frontage should have been at least '2,000 yards, because the ridge was some 6.000 yards distant, and because in siege-warfare the normal depth of pene tration is half the length of the initial base. Nevertheless, in this battle, the first of the British grand attacks, and the first in which the "barrage" was used, more common sense was shown in restrict ing the artillery bombardment to the shortest possible time than in any subsequent battle up to that of Cambrai in November 1917. The German defences were but half a mile deep, and it was possible to fracture them by artillery fire if the bombardment were rapid, for rapidity carried with it surprise.