NILE, BATTLE OF THE. The battle of the Nile was fought in Aboukir Bay, near Alexandria, on Aug. 1, 1798. It arose out of Napoleon's famous Egyptian Expedition, the first news of which had reached Jervis, off Cadiz, earlier in the year, in the shape of rumours of great activity in the port of Toulon. In the previous year the first European coalition against revolutionary France had been finally dissolved by the elimination of Austria, the result being that in 1798 France was at war with England only, and this eastern expedition with its proposed, though un likely, result of an attack on India, was considered by Napoleon to be the most hopeful means of embarrassing England, while at the same time keeping himself in the limelight. As soon as Jervis heard of the preparations at Toulon, the object of which was, of course, unknown to him, he despatched Nelson with a small force to reconnoitre, and soon afterwards he had an opportunity of reinforcing him. Pitt was trying to build a new coalition against France, and was approaching Austria who made England's re-entry into the Mediterranean, which she had been forced to evacuate, a condition of acceptance. Jervis was thus ordered to send a detachment through the Straits of Gibraltar with instruc tions to find out whether a re-entry into the Mediterranean was feasible ; what he did was to reinforce Nelson so as to bring his strength up to 14 ships, 13 of them seventy-fours and one a fifty. Before Nelson was joined by his reinforcements and while he commanded only three seventy-fours and some frigates, he was forced from his station, off Toulon, by a gale. He suffered severely in this and—perhaps worst misfortune of all—was separated from his frigates which went to Gibraltar in the expectation that the admiral would go there to refit. The absence of "the eyes of the fleet" during the ensuing search for the French was obviously a great handicap. The remaining ships were repaired somehow and by May 31 they were back off Toulon, having been absent ten days, but the French were gone. The direction of the wind led Nelson to believe that the kingdom of the two Sicilies was the danger-point, and that the French had not made for the Straits of Gibraltar as it was believed in England they would. Conse quently he made for the Bay of Naples, and on June 7 was joined by the reinforcements from Jervis. Malta was the next point at which it was decided to aim, but, while the fleet was in the neigh bourhood of Cape Passaro, news reached it that the island had fallen to the French. It was this news that shook the public confidence, generally so strong, in Nelson, and for a time it was considered that he was being out-manoeuvred. The problem before him was certainly a hard one. With the intuition, however, for which he was so famous, he decided on Egypt as Napoleon's next stopping-place, and made sail for Alexandria. He found it empty and impetuously left, on June 3o, to search elsewhere. On the following day the French arrived, actually sighting the topsails of the last ships of the departing English fleet, which ranged the coast of Asia Minor in its search and finally arrived at Syracuse.
Here, by the kind influence of Lady Hamilton with the Neapolitan court, the fleet was entirely revictualled and immediately sailed again for the East. After further searching, Nelson decided to try Alexandria once more, and this time was rewarded by the sight of the republican tricolour floating over the town. A little later the French fleet could be seen anchored in Aboukir Bay. The long search was ended.
Aboukir Bay is situated about fifteen miles north-east of Alex andria and is about fifteen miles wide, extending from Aboukir Point on its westerly side to the Rosetta mouth of the Nile. The bay was silted up and its western curve offered exactly the sort of refuge de Brueys, the French Admiral, was seeking for the protec tion of his fleet which consisted of nine seventy-fours, three eight ies, "L'Orient" of 120 guns, and four frigates. He had hoped to station this fleet in such a manner that it would be impossible for an attacking enemy to do more than fight him from seawards. The curving shoals seemed to offer him such a position, and he had drawn up his fleet facing north and north-west in a very obtuse angle, with his own ship, "L'Orient," at the apex, and the ships at the extremities of the line close to the shallows. The frigates he placed between this line and the shoals. So certain was de Brueys that this arrangement would prevent the British getting between him and the land that his ships were not even prepared for action on the landward side. An ordinary attack on his seaward side would, he thought, favour him, since the enemy would be under sail and, further, he had prepared batteries ashore which would enfilade their position. To Nelson's experienced eye, however, a weakness in these dispositions was at once apparent. The French ships were anchored in such a manner that there was nothing to prevent them swinging, and, as Nelson himself put it, "where there is room for a Frenchman to swing, there is room for a Briton to anchor"; in other words it would, for all de Brueys's care, be pos sible to attack the French on the landward side, either by cutting in between the leading ship and the shoals, or by breaking through between two ships. The British fleet was approaching from the north with the wind a little west of north, so that there was noth ing to prevent their doing either or both. Nelson's orders were that part of the fleet was to get to landward of the enemy and part was to remain to seaward ; the northern end of the line was to be attacked first and the English ships were to anchor only by the stern so that, by merely paying out cable, they would be able, as each French ship was demolished, to move on to deal with others which would, owing to the direction of the wind, have found it impossible to come to the assistance of those attacked first.