Battles of the Narew

NAREW, BATTLES OF THE. The battles on the river Narew, north-east of Warsaw, in July and Aug. 1915, were a part of the great offensive planned by Falkenhayn against Russia. During May and June, Mackensen had driven the Russian armies in Galicia from Tarnow on the Dunajec to the east of Lemberg (see DUNAJEC SAN; LEMBERG). In July the group of armies un der his command was directed north-east towards Brest-Litovsk against the communications of the Russian forces which still held the Warsaw salient (see BREST-LITOVSK). Hindenburg, who com manded the group of armies on the northern part of the Eastern Front, was now ordered to strike a blow on the north side of the salient. Falkenhayn hoped thus by driving in the flanks of the salient to cut off large numbers of Russians in its apex about Warsaw. The realization of this hope depended, of course, on the rapidity with which the flanks could be forced.

Rival German Plans.

The operation against the Narew line is of interest because of the controversy it provoked between the two men who had most influence on German strategy during the war, Falkenhayn and Ludendorff. The former was at this time chief of the German Great General Staff, and thus responsible for the supreme direction of the war ; the latter was chief of staff to Hindenburg. Ludendorff had long cherished the idea of a Na poleonic manoeuvre against the Russian rear by Kovno and Wilno on Minsk, and considered the proposed Narew offensive as timid and ineffectual; Falkenhayn, with heavier responsibilities on his shoulders, mistrusted both the feasibility and the expedience of the Wilno adventure. He could not afford to become so deeply involved in the Eastern theatre as to be unable to withdraw troops to meet the coming offensive in the West. After a discussion of the alternative plans held in the presence of the kaiser, Falken hayn's views were approved ; and Hindenburg was ordered to carry out the Narew attack.

A formidable water barrier protects Russian Poland against invasion from East Prussia, formed by the Niemen, the Bobr, the Narew and the lower course of the Bug, and thence the Vis tula to the frontier. The Russians had fortified this river line.

Besides the fortresses of Kovno and Grodno, Osoweic, Lomza and Nowa-Georgiewsk, there were fortified bridge-heads on the Narew at Ostroleka, Rozan, Pultusk and Zegrze. Though the river was fordable in the summer at many points, marshes along its length increased its effectiveness as an obstacle.

The German

Attack.--Gallwitz's army, which was to make the attack, comprised six corps (14 divisions). Opposite to it, on the lower Vistula, lay the Russian I. Army (Litvinov) with three corps and a cavalry corps.

The tactical details of the fighting are not of any special in terest. On July 13 Gallwitz delivered his first attack on the approximate line Przasnysz-CiechanOw, aiming at Pultusk. The Russians, over-weighted both in numbers and heavy artillery, at once fell back more than half-way to the Narew line. They were attacked again on July 15, and during July 18 and 19 withdrew across the river, the Russian XII. Army on their right conforming to the movement. Reinforcements had now arrived and resistance stiffened. Though the Germans stormed the bridge-heads of Pul tusk and Rozan on July 23, and secured crossings over the river, their further progress was limited by violent Russian counter-at tacks, and they were unable to reach the line WyszkOw-Ostrow (on the lower Bug), at which they were aiming. An attempt to force a passage further east at Ostroleka on July 3o failed, and it was not until Aug. 4 that this bridge-head fell. Losses were heavy on both sides; but the Russians had secured time and space sufficient to evacuate the Warsaw salient without danger.

Hindenburg and Ludendorff naturally claimed that the result of the battle vindicated their opinion on the mistaken strategy of the Supreme Command. Falkenhayn retorted that the opera tions would have had the desired effect of intercepting the Russian retreat had Hindenburg used the full force available and given Gallwitz 20 divisions instead of 14. It seems doubtful, however, whether the communications would have allowed the effective employment of so large a force.