OXENSTJERNA, COUNT AXEL GUSTAFSSON (1583-1654), chancellor of Sweden, was born at Fono, and was educated with his brothers at the universities of Rostock, Jena and Wittenberg. On returning home in 1603 he was appointed kammerjunker to King Charles IX. In i6o6 he was entrusted with his first diplomatic mission, to Mecklenburg, was appointed a senator during his absence, and henceforth became one of the king's most trusted servants. In 1610 he was sent to Copenhagen to prevent a war with Denmark. This unsuccessful embassy marks the beginning of Oxenstjerna's long diplomatic struggle with Sweden's traditional rival in the north. Oxenstjerna was appointed a member of Gustavus Adolphus's council of regency. High aristocrat as he was, he would at first willingly have limited the royal power. An oligarchy guiding a limited monarchy was his ideal government, but the genius of the young king was not to be fettered. On Jan. 6, 1612, he was appointed chancellor. His controlling, organizing hand was speedily felt in every branch of the administration. For his services as first Swedish plenipoten tiary at the Peace of Knared, 1613, he was richly rewarded.
During the frequent absences of Gustavus in Livonia and Finland (1614-1616) Oxenstjerna acted as his vice-regent. It was his principal duty during the king's Russian and Polish wars to supply the armies and the fleets with everything necessary, including men and money. In 1622 he accompanied Gustavus to Livonia, where Oxenstjerna was appointed governor-general and commandant of Riga. His services in Livonia were rewarded with four castles and the whole bishopric of Wenden. He was en trusted with the peace negotiations which led to the truce with Poland in 1623, and succeeded, by skilful diplomacy, in averting a threatened rupture with Denmark in 1624. On Oct. 7, 1626, he was appointed governor-general of the newly-acquired Prussian province. In 1629 he concluded the truce of Altmark with Poland. In 1628 he had arranged with Denmark a joint occupation of Stralsund, to prevent the fortress from falling into the hands of the Imperialists. After the battle of Breitenfeld (Sept. 7, 1631) he was summoned to assist the king with his counsels and co operation in Germany. During the king's absence in Franconia and Bavaria in 1632 he was appointed legatus in the Rhine lands, with plenipotentiary authority over all the German generals and princes in the Swedish service.
Although he never fought a battle, Oxenstjerna was a born strategist. His military capacity was strikingly demonstrated by the skill with which he conducted large reinforcements to Gus tavus through the heart of Germany in the summer of 1632. But it was only after the death of the king at Liitzen that Oxenstjerna's true greatness came to light. He inspired the despairing Prot estants both in Germany and Sweden with fresh hopes. He reorganized the government both at home and abroad. He united the estates of the four upper circles into a fresh league against the common foe (1634), in spite of the envious and foolish oppo sition of Saxony. By the patent of Jan. 12, 1633, he had already
been appointed legate plenipotentiary of Sweden in Germany with absolute control over all the territory already won by the Swedish arms. No Swedish subject, either before or after, ever held such an unrestricted and far-reaching authority. Richelieu himself declared that the Swedish chancellor was "an inexhaust ible source of well-matured counsels." Less original but more sagacious than the king, he had a firmer grasp of the realities of the situation. Gustavus would not only have aggrandized Sweden, he would have transformed the German empire. Oxenstjerna wisely abandoned these vaulting ambitions. All his efforts were directed towards procuring for the Swedish crown adequate compensation for its sacrifices. Simple to aus terity in his own tastes, he nevertheless recognized the political necessity of impressing his allies and confederates by an almost regal show of dignity; and at the abortive congress of Frankfort on-Main (March 1634), held for the purpose of uniting all the German Protestants, Oxenstjerna appeared in a carriage drawn by six horses, with German princes attending him on foot. But from first to last his policy suffered from the slenderness of Sweden's material resources, a cardinal defect which all his craft and tact could not altogether conceal from the vigilance of her enemies. The success of his system postulated an uninterrupted series of triumphs, whereas a single reverse was likely to be fatal to it. Thus the frightful disaster of Nordlingen (Sept. 6th, 1634; see SWEDEN History) compelled him to solicit direct assistance from France. But he refused at the conference of Compiegne (1635) to bind his hands in the future for the sake of some slight present relief. In 1636, however, he concluded a fresh subsidy treaty with France at Wismar.
The same year he returned to Sweden and took his seat in the Regency. For the next nine years his voice, especially as re garded foreign affairs, was omnipotent in the council of state. He drew up beforehand the plan of the Danish War of 1645, so brilliantly executed by Lennart Torstensson, and saw Denmark crippled by the Peace of Bromsebro (1645). His later years were embittered by the jealousy of the young Queen Chris tina, who thwarted the old statesman in every direction. He always attributed the exiguity of Sweden's gains by the Peace of Osnabruck to Christina's undue interference. Oxenstjerna was opposed at first to the abdication of Christina, because he feared mischief to Sweden from her appointed successor, Charles Gus tavus. The extraordinary consideration shown to him by the new king ultimately, however, reconciled him to the change. He died at Stockholm on Aug. 28, See Axel Oxenstjernas skriften och brefvexling (Stockholm, 1888 1905) ; A. de Manly, Oxenstjerna et Richelieu a Compiegne (Paris, 1878) ; F. V. Wrangel, Voyage en France d'Oxen,stierna (1917) ; Gabriel Gustafssons bref till Riks Konsler Axel Oxenstjerna, 1611-164o (Stock holm, 189o).