Moscow.—Realising that the Russians would never consent to the extension of the French empire, which under the necessity of the Continental blockade had ended by annexing the Hansa towns of Bremen and Hamburg, and making them the principal cities of two of its hundred and thirty departments, he saw that war was inevitable. French territory now stretched to the Baltic, and the nearer its boundaries approached those of Russia, the greater was the danger of conflict. Difficulties arose continually over Oldenburg, Poland, the East, and the reluctance of Russia to abandon trade with England. The two allied emperors were arming against each other. These preparations were themselves a further offence. Convinced that this new struggle had been decreed by fate, and that his work would not be accomplished till he had vanquished Russia as he had vanquished Prussia and Aus tria, Napoleon now assembled for the campaign of 1812 the greatest army which the world had yet seen, an army of "twenty nations" made up of contingents from all the peoples allied to or dependent on France, a sort of Western crusade against Asiatic Russia. By natural inclination, as much as by policy, Napoleon raised ,again for this crusade the battle cry of the Revolution, the liberation of nationalities, of which the reconstitution of Poland was to be the token. He forgot that the Spaniards were already fighting for their independence, and that the nationalism, awakened by principles of the Revolution, was stirring the people of Germany. Alexander, who could play many parts, also spoke the language of liberalism, invoked justice, enlisted on his side the countries defeated and subjugated by France or in rebellion against her, and prepared for peace with Prussia and Austria by complicity in the partition of the Polish provinces. Napoleon was thus to stake everything on the inevitable Russian campaign. Victorious, he would be master of the East, of Constantinople, of all Europe, and would at last force the English to capitulate. De feated, he himself would have given the signal for the debacle. The war which began in 1792, having carried the French to the gates of Moscow was to return by a swift and violent revulsion to the gates of Paris.
In June 1812 the grande armee crossed the Niemen. According to their custom, the Russians declined battle. Alexander had said that he would retire if necessary beyond Tobolsk, while Napoleon imagined himself dictating peace from Moscow. The Russians set fire to the city, and made no peace. Then began a retreat which after the passage of the Beresina became a disaster. In the month of December, Ney and Gerard arrived at Konigsberg almost alone. The grande armee had melted away. Realising the extent of the catastrophe, and its probable effects in Europe and in France itself, the emperor had secretly left the army, which was kept in ignorance of his departure. The news of General Malet's conspiracy, which had reached him in Russia, had shown him how precarious was his position and how much weakened his prestige.
themselves on the 18th Brumaire had entrusted him with the task of saving the Revolution and its conquests. To this end France had allowed him to take the crown, to found a dynasty, to overrun three-quarters of Europe and to raise countless armies. All in vain. In a few months he was back at his starting point.
The Spanish insurrection of 1809 had encouraged England to persevere, and had revived the resistance of the conquered peoples. The disasters of the Grand Army in 1813 spurred on his enemies still more. "A few more sacrifices," said the English, "and our end is accomplished." Not even the long hoped for declaration of war by the United States, due not to French diplomacy but to the doctrine of the freedom of the seas as opposed to the English "tyranny at sea," could affect the determination of the British government. Everything pointed to a vast change of fortune in favour of the cause of which England, at one moment, had re mained the sole champion. Nationalist propaganda was bearing fruit in Germany. Prussia, while still protesting fidelity to Na poleon, had shifted her allegiance, and secretly reconstituted her army. A Prussian corps in French service, commanded by General York, went over to the Russians. Its defection made a great sen sation in Germany and hastened the continued retreat to the Elbe of the remnants of the French army. The Prussian government then unmasked and, obedient to popular opinion, proclaimed a war of liberation and independence.
Napoleon chose to consider his Russian defeat as an accident. In Germany it would always be easy for him, he thought, to beat the Prussians and the Russians ; having raised and trained a fresh army he did, in fact, beat them at Lutzen and at Bautzen. The campaign of 1813 opened well. He was, however, justly appre hensive of Austria, and instead of following up these fresh suc cesses he agreed to an armistice, so as to be ready for the third adversary. A coalition of Austria, Prussia and Russia had no ter rors for him. He wished to settle with it as quickly as possible, thinking that he held enough cards to secure even from England a favourable peace. The victory of Dresden (Aug. 27) seemed to justify this. But, one after the other, his generals, badly served by their contingents from the Germanic Confederation, were beaten in the field, and his plans were delayed. At Leipzig, where he had returned to prevent the junction of his three opponents, Napoleon fought a three days' battle (Oct. 16-19), during which his Saxon troops went over to the enemy. Having lost this im mense battle, and all Germany with it, he had to fall back to the Rhine. In November what had been the grande armee entered Mainz, after fighting its way through the Bavarians who in their turn had betrayed him.
Was it possible, on the banks of the Rhine, to secure peace on the basis of "natural frontiers"? The question had been identical under the Revolution. Prussia showed herself at last as the Ger man power most fiercely opposed to France, and England insisted on the renunciation of Antwerp. This was, as it had been during twenty years of war, the question at stake.