The Egyptian expedition was thus indirectly to be the means of forcing the British government to recognise the territorial ac quisitions of the Revolution. The weakness of this plan, a weak ness inherent in the whole struggle with England, was that France had no navy. Though Bonaparte, by a fortunate combination of circumstances, was able to land his army near Alexandria (July 1, 1798), Nelson, a month later (Aug. 1), destroyed the French fleet at Aboukir. From that moment the Egyptian expedition, instead of being "le commencement d'une grande chose" was merely an adventure. In vain Bonaparte executed a brilliant campaign, cap turing Cairo, and subduing the country in three weeks. Of the great expedition nothing has endured but famous sayings, such as "Soldiers, from these pyramids forty centuries look down on you"; the Institute of Egyptology ; the diffusion of the French language in the valley of the Nile; and, in Bonaparte's own case, a romantic touch of orientalism, symbolised by his faithful mame luke Roustan. Nevertheless, to carry through his great scheme, he undertook the conquest of Syria. Acre, under Admiral Sidney Smith, held out. "That man made me miss my destiny," he said later.
The Coup d'Etat.—The expedition was, in fact, a failure. Bonaparte realized that there was nothing to be done in Egypt. At the same time came news which told him that there was work for him in France. The directory was in difficulties both at home and abroad. Disorder was rampant, finance and currency desperate, discontent everywhere. The Government, not knowing which way to turn, swayed one day to the Jacobins, the next to the moderates. In Germany the war continued, and in Italy the Republican armies suffered a series of reverses, and invasion was only checked with difficulty by Brune at Bergen, and by Massena at Zurich. The restoration of the monarchy seemed inevitable. The republic could be saved only by a military leader.
"I seek a sword," said Sieyes, one of the five directors, racking his brains for a general to whom he could confide the defence of the Republic. At that crucial moment Bonaparte decided to return. He went boldly on board a frigate, slipped through the English cruisers in the Mediterranean, and landed at Frejus on Oct. 8, 1799. He was greeted with shouts of "Long live the republic." He was the man of the hour for all those who desired an end of anarchy but were opposed to the return of the Bour bons. Without him the Revolution was a lost cause. This con sideration is essential to the understanding of the famous coup d'etat of the 18 Brumaire (Nov. 9, 1799).
The coup d'etat was organized, indeed, from within. Not only had Bonaparte accomplices among those in power, he had not even to offer or to impose himself ; he was sought out. Baudin,
a deputy from the Ardennes, and a staunch Republican, died of joy when he heard of the return of "General V endemiaire," who was once more to save the Republic. Of the five directors, Sieyes, though a regicide, had given up hope of saving the country ex cept by a dictatorship, of which he hoped to be the head, with Bonaparte as his strong right hand. Roger-Ducos was of the same opinion. The third, Barras, was corrupt, and would do anything for money. Only the remaining two, Moulin and Gohier, were immovable in their Jacobinism, and had to be silenced. Resistance could come only from political circles, the assemblies, or per haps from part of the army, where Jacobinism was still strong. The conspirators were assured in advance of the support of pub lic opinion. It is, therefore, essential to note that the coup d'etat was conceived and organized by Sieyes, who took charge of the parliamentary side, while Bonaparte was an executive agent charged with assuring the support of the army. We must not forget that from its origin to the days of Fructidor and Prairial, the Revolution had undergone many forcible changes and had violated its different constitutions over and over again.
The pretext for the transference of the two legislative assem blies from Paris to Saint Cloud on the 18 Brumaire was a ter rorist plot invented for the occasion. The plan, though well laid, all but miscarried. On the first day, that of 18 Brumaire, all went well, and, as the Convention had done in Vendemiaire, the assemblies placed Bonaparte in command of their forces. On the morrow at Saint Cloud, affairs took a dangerous turn. The Upper Chamber or Council of the "Ancients" had been won over, but the lower or Council of the Five Hundred, whose Jacobin members had had time to summon their forces, greeted the general with shouts of "Down with the dictator! Outlaw him!" Bonaparte lost the thread of his speech, lost countenance, and for a moment was surrounded by a threatening crowd of deputies. Soldiers came to his assistance; however, the day would have been lost but for his brother Lucien, who had made his way in politics and was president of the assembly. Declaring that the right of free speech had been outraged, he dramatically threw off his insignia and rushed into the court of the Orangery to harangue the still hesitat ing soldiers. Bonaparte, having recovered from a fainting condi tion, appeared, his face bleeding where, in his agitation, he had scratched it. This made the soldiers think that he had been wounded. General Leclerc, his brother-in-law, thus charged at the head of his grenadiers and cleared the hall of the refractory deputies. That very evening Bonaparte, Sieyes and Roger-Ducos were elected "consuls" by the Council of the Ancients.