NAVAL STRATEGY AND TACTICS. Naval strategy in its broad sense does not differ in principle from any other war strategy. It may be defined as the disposition of forces vis-ŕ-vis those of the enemy outside the actual battle arena. The term must not be confused with tactics, which relate to the disposition and employment of forces in battle. Whereas certain well-defined principles governing sound strategy can be culled from history and adapted to present-day conditions, tactics must be studied chiefly in relation to weapons and mobility, factors which have changed repeatedly in the past and which must continue to change with the march of science and the development of material.
It is a defect in not a few works on naval warfare that the writers do not differentiate clearly between strategy and tactics in appraising the value of historical examples; but history, mod ern as well as ancient, establishes certain immutable strategical principles governing the use and disposition of forces in war. As applied to naval warfare these may be summarised as follows : ( i ) Naval efforts, like military operations, must always be subordinate to government policy; but although political aims may tend to influence war plans, they should never be allowed by ministers and their professional advisers to dictate a course of action which is at variance with sound strategy. (2) The primary mission of a navy in war is to deny the use of the sea to the enemy, while preserving it for friendly interests. (3) Concentra tion of effort must always be aimed at, because with it goes the conservation of energy and economy of force.
History provides a number of examples where political aims have conflicted -with the correct military objective in war, and where the subordination of the latter to the former has imperilled the issue. This condition of affairs has almost invariably arisen from a lack of community in thought and in counsel between political leaders and the heads of the fighting Services. On occa sion the latter have been deliberately excluded from councils where the most momentous decisions regarding the conduct of war have been taken. On others, although present, they have, through a false sense of diffidence or through being personally inarticulate, failed to give the Government the benefit of their professional knowledge and experience. This defect in the ma chine of State has been remedied to a great extent of late by the British Government, who have now charged the three professional heads of the navy, army and air force with the duty of presenting collective advice on all defence matters to the committee of Imperial Defence, of which these three high officers are perma nent members, while the Prime Minister or his deputy is chair man. In other respects the composition of this committee varies
with the problem under review, so that it always possesses a truly representative character. On the outbreak of hostilities it would doubtless be transformed into a War Cabinet which would enunci ate the war policy governing the strategic disposition and employ ment of the fighting forces. Fundamentally that policy must be directed towards the attainment of the one clear purpose for which a nation takes up arms, namely to impose its will so effectively on the enemy that he will sue for peace on that nation's own terms.
In the past it has frequently occurred that effort has been dis persed and wasted by engaging in attractive, but subsidiary, projects whereby the main object was lost sight of and the war unduly protracted. As an example may be quoted the misuse of a large proportion of the British fleet during the years 1793-5 in operations directed to acquire French and Dutch possessions in the West Indies. The assumption wad that this course would add to British resources and reduce those of the enemy, but in effect it jeopardised sea security to an extent which might have proved disastrous. By dispersal of strength, the British fleet in the Mediterranean was at one time five sail of the line below the number of the French fleet at Toulon. As the First Sea Lord of that day, Sir Charles Middleton, wrote : "It is this system of unlimited conquest that cripples us everywhere and diverts the fleet from its natural uses. . . . But for this system, half the number of ships now employed in the West Indies and in army convoys would have been sufficient and the French be prevented from sending a single ship to sea." Here was the case of a political aim, the capture of possessions, being allowed to outweigh the sound military object of bringing to action or neutralising the enemy's principle naval forces. With the enemy main fleet defeated or closely blockaded, England would have secured the unchallenged use of the seas, while they would have been denied to her enemy. Even if this did not of itself end the war, it would have greatly facilitated any subsequent project for territorial conquest.