The Austrian War of 1809

THE AUSTRIAN WAR OF 1809 Ever since Austerlitz the Austrian officers had been labouring to reconstitute and reform their army. Much had been done to create an efficient staff, but though the idea of the army corps command was now no new thing, the senior generals entrusted with these commands were far from having acquired the inde pendence and initiative of their French opponents. Hence the extraordinary slowness of their manoeuvres, not because the Aus trian infantry were bad marchers, but because the preparation and circulation of orders was still far behind the French standard. The infantry adopted the highly manoeuvrable formations of the French—skirmishers and columns—but it was easier to adopt the formations than to acquire the initiative which gave these their vital energy. The light cavalry had been much improved and the heavy cavalry on the whole proved a fair match for their opponents.

After the peace of Tilsit the Grande Armee was gradually with drawn behind the Rhine, leaving only three commands, totalling 63,00o men, under Davout in Prussia, Oudinot in west central Germany, and Lefebvre in Bavaria, to assist the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine in the maintenance of order and the enforcement of the French law of conscription, which was rigor ously insisted on in all the States comprised in this new federa tion. In exchange for the subsistence of the French troops of occupation, a corresponding number of these new levies were moved to the south of France, where they commenced to arrive at the moment when the situation in Spain became acute. The Peninsular War (q.v.) called for large forces of the old Grande Armee and for a brief period Napoleon directed operations in person ; and the Austrians took advantage of the dissemination and weakness of the French forces in Germany to push forward their own preparations with renewed energy.

But they reckoned without the resourcefulness of Napoleon. The moment news of their activity reached him, whilst still in pursuit of Sir John Moore, he despatched letters to all the members of the Confederation warning them that their con tingents might soon be required, and at the same time issued a series of decrees to General Clarke, his war minister, authorizing him to call up the contingent of 1810 in advance, and directing him in detail to proceed with the formation of 4th and 5th battalions for all the regiments across the Rhine. By these means Davout's, Oudinot's and Lefebvre's commands were augmented, whilst in February and March new corps were formed and rapidly pushed towards the front.

On his return from Spain, seeing war imminent, he issued a series of march orders (which deserve the closest study in detail) by which on April 15 his whole army was to be concentrated for manoeuvres between Regensburg, Landshut, Augsburg and Donauworth, and sending on the Guard in wagons to Strassburg, he despatched Berthier to act as commander-in-chief until his own arrival.

Austrian Offensive.

The position of assembly was excel lently chosen, but unfortunately the Austrians took the initiative. On April 9 their main body of six corps crossed the Inn between Braunau and Passau and simultaneously two additional corps moved from Pilsen in Bohemia on Regensburg. At this moment Davout was entering Regensburg with his leading troops, the re mainder still some marches in rear, and it was evident that the whole concentration could no longer be carried out before the Aus trians would be in a position to intervene. Berthier received the news while still on his way to the front, and quite failed to grasp the situation. Reaching Donauworth at 8 P.M. on April 13, he ordered Davout and Oudinot to remain at Regensburg, whilst Lefebvre and Wrede (Bavarians) who had fallen back before the Austrians were directed to reoccupy Landshut. This was in direct contradiction to the instructions Napoleon had given on March 28 in view of this very emergency. Davout obeyed, but remonstrated. On the i6th Berthier went on to Augsburg, where he learned that Lefebvre's advanced troops had been driven out of Landshut, thus opening a great gap seventy-six miles wide between the two wings of the French army. Meanwhile Napoleon, who had left Paris at 4 A.M. on April 13, was hastening towards the front, but remained still in ignorance of Berthier's doings until on the 16th at Stuttgart he received a letter from the Marshal dated the i3th, which threw him into consternation. In reply he immediately wrote : "You do not inform me what has rendered necessary such an extraordinary measure which weakens and divides my troops" —and—"I cannot quite grasp the meaning of your letter yet, I should have preferred to see my army concentrated between Ingol stadt and Augsburg, the Bavarians in the first line, with the duke of Danzig in his old position, until we know what the enemy is going to do. Everything would be excellent if the duke of Auer stadt had been at Ingolstadt and the duke of Rivoli with the Wurttembergers and Oudinot's corps at Augsburg, . . . so that just the opposite of what should have been done has been done" (C. N. to Berthier, Ludwigsburg, 16th April).