The Campaign in France in 1814

In the meantime Blucher had rallied his scattered forces and was driving Marmont and Mortier before him. Napoleon, as soon as he had disembarrassed himself of Schwarzenberg, counter marched his main body and moving again by Sezanne, fell upon Blucher's left and drove him back upon Soissons. This place had been held by a French garrison, but had capitulated only twenty four hours beforehand, a fact of which Napoleon was naturally unaware. The Silesian army was thus able to escape, and march ing northwards combined with Bernadotte at Laon—this rein forcement bringing the forces at Bliicher's disposal up to over Ioo,000 men. On March 7 Napoleon fell upon the advance guard of this force at Craonne and drove it back upon Laon, where a battle took place on the 9th. Napoleon was here defeated, and with only 30,00o men at his back he was compelled to renounce all ideas of a further offensive, and he retired to rest his troops at Reims. Here he remained unmolested for a few days, for Blucher was struck down by sickness, and in his absence nothing was done. On March 14, however, Schwarzenberg, becoming aware of Napoleon's withdrawal to Reims, again began his ad vance and had reached Arcis-sur-Aube when the news of Na poleon's approach again induced him to retreat to Brienne.

The Allies March on Paris.

Thus after six weeks' fighting the allies were hardly more advanced than at the beginning. Now, however, they began to realize the weakness of their opponent, and, still more, the weakening of his political stability. Napoleon, coincidently, aware of the limitations of a strategy of continual parrying, was seized with the idea of a decisive coup against Schwarzenberg's communications. He determined to move east ward to St. Dizier, rally what garrisons he could find, and raise the whole country against the invaders, and had actually started on the execution of this plan when his instructions fell into the enemy's hands and his projects were exposed. The Czar Alexander called a council of war at which General Toll in opposition to his seniors, urged that instead of following Napoleon the allies should disregard the threat to their rear and advance by forced marches on Paris, whose people were reported to be "tired of the war and of Napoleon." His arguments for this moral objective won over the Czar and at his instigation the allies marched straight for the capital. Marmont and Mortier with what troops they could rally took up a position on Montmartre heights to oppose them, but seeing further resistance to be hopeless they gave way on March 31, just as Napoleon, with the wreck of the Guards and a mere handful of other detachments, was hurrying across the rear of the Austrians towards Fontainebleau to join them.

This was the end of the First Empire. The story of the The Peace of Amiens in 1802 was productive of but a brief truce. Napoleon's ambitions and actions were such as quickly to re-awaken European suspicions, and his refusal to evacuate the Netherlands was alone enough to arouse England and cause her to declare war on him as early as May 18, 1803. From then on

wards, for over two years, the war took the form of a gigantic scheme, on the part of Napoleon, for an invasion of England—a scheme which led to the movements known as the Trafalgar Cam paign which, in its turn, led to the Battle of Trafalgar. Boulogne was chosen as the base for the French operations; along the coast on either side an army of some 150,000 men was encamped, and specially-constructed flat-bottomed boats for their transport were brought from all parts of France. The army was given constant practice in embarkation and disembarkation, and, in the meantime, it proved impossible for the British ships to do much damage to this armament owing to the shallow water on the coastline. In order, however, to carry through his scheme successfully, Napo leon had got to obtain at least a temporary control of the Chan nel, and this meant either defeating the British fleet on equal terms in action, or, by some means, causing the various parts of it to scatter on some wild-goose chase, so giving himself the chance to bring every available ship to the Channel and over whelm the British fleet there by sheer weight of numbers. French fleets were stationed at Brest, Rochefort, L'Orient and Toulon; all of them were watched by British blockading squadrons. From the end of 1804, when Spain entered the war on his side, Napo leon was able to add to this total Spanish squadrons at Corunna, Ferrol, Cadiz and Cartagena, all of which the British blockaded. The total number of ships at Napoleon's command was about 6o, the English had an approximately equal number employed in blockading them. His plan, then, took the form of attempting to elude these blockading squadrons and make them scatter to various parts of the world in search of his escaped squadrons which would, after concentrating at a given rendez-vous, return to the Channel to crush Cornwallis and the English Channel Fleet, if indeed that had not scattered too, after the presumed escape of the Brest Fleet which it was blockading. In either case Napo leon might hope to achieve his object—control of the Channel for long enough to enable him to take his troops across, while the British squadrons returned from the various parts of the world to which he seemed to think they might sail. The scheme was an exceedingly weak one, and postulated a gross ignorance of naval strategy on the part of that country that had been its greatest exponent. The British Admiralty upset it by a single order. The various blockading squadrons, if they were eluded by the squad rons they were blockading, were to fall back on Cornwallis. Thus if all the French squadrons united at the appointed rendez-vous (which was Martinique) and sailed for the Channel, they would merely find Cornwallis with an equally concentrated fleet, and the extent of the British concentration would depend on, and be equal to, that of the French.