THE CAMPAIGN IN FRANCE IN 1814 When the last of the French troops had crossed to the western bank of the Rhine, divided counsels made their appearance at the headquarters of the allies. Everyone was weary of the war, and many felt that it would be unwise to push Napoleon and the French nation to extremes. Hence a prolonged halt arose, utilized by the troops in renewing their equipment and so forth, but ulti mately the Young German party, led by Blucher and the principal fighting men of the army, triumphed, and on Jan. 1, 1814, the Silesian army (5o,000) began its passage of the Rhine at Kaub. They were to be supported by Schwarzenberg with 200,000 men, who was to advance by Basel and Neu Breisach to the south, and Bernadotte with the Northern army, about 120,00o, was to move in support on the right flank through the Netherlands and Laon; this force was not yet ready and did not, in fact, reach the latter place till March. To meet these forces the emperor could not collect 200,000 men in all, of whom upwards of too,000 were held by Wellington on the Spanish frontier, and 20,000 more were re quired to watch the debouches from the Alps. Hence less than 8o,000 remained available for the east and north-eastern frontier. If, however, he was weak in numbers, he was now again operating in a friendly country, able to find food almost everywhere and practically indifferent as to his communications.
On Jan. 25 Bliicher entered Nancy, and, moving rapidly up the valley of the Moselle, was in communication with the Austrian advanced guard near La Rothiere on the afternoon of the 28th. Here his headquarters were surprised and he himself nearly cap tured by a sudden rush of French troops, and he learnt at the same time that the emperor in person was at hand. He accordingly fell back a few miles next morning to a strong position covering the exits from the Bar-sur-Aube defile. There he was joined by the Austrian advance guard, and together they decided to accept battle—indeed they had no alternative, as the roads in rear were so choked with traffic that retreat was out of the question. About noon Feb. 2 Napoleon attacked them, but the weather was ter rible, and the ground so heavy that his favourite artillery, the mainstay of his whole system of warfare, was useless and in the drifts of snow which at intervals swept across the field, the columns lost their direction and many were severely handled by the Cossacks. At nightfall the fighting ceased and the emperor
retired to Lesmont, and thence to Troyes, Marmont being left to observe the enemy.
Montmirail.—Owing to the state of the roads, more perhaps to the extraordinary lethargy which always characterized Schwarzen berg's headquarters, no pursuit was attempted. But on Feb. 4 BlUcher, chafing at this inaction, obtained the permission of his own sovereign to transfer his line of operations to the valley of the Marne ; Pahlen's corps of Cossacks were assigned to him to cover his left and maintain communication with the Austrians. Believ ing himself secure behind this screen, he advanced from Vitry along the roads leading down the valley of the Marne, with his columns widely separated for convenience of subsistence and shelter—the latter being almost essential in the terrible weather prevailing. Blucher himself on the night of the 7th was at Sezanne, on the exposed flank so as to be nearer to his sources of intelli gence, and the rest of his army were distributed in four small corps at or near Epernay, Montmirail and Etoges; reinforcements also were on their way to join him and were then about Vitry.
In the night his headquarters were again surprised, and he learnt that Napoleon himself with his main body was in full march to fall on his scattered detachments. At the same time he heard that Pahlen's Cossacks had been withdrawn forty-eight hours previously, thus completely exposing his flank. He himself retreated towards Etoges endeavouring to rally his scattered de tachments, but Napoleon was too quick for him and in three suc cessive days he defeated Sacken at Montmirail, Yorck at Champ Aubert and Bliicher and his main body at Etoges, pursuing the latter towards Vertus. These disasters compelled the retreat of the whole Silesian army, and Napoleon, leaving Mortier and Marmont to deal with them, hurried back to Troyes with his main body to strike the flank of Schwarzenberg's army, which had meanwhile begun its leisurely advance, and again at Mormant on Feb. 17, Montereau the 18th and Mery the nst, he inflicted such heavy punishment upon his adversaries that they fell back precipitately to Bar-sur-Aube.