The Campaign of 1805

The March on Ulm.

The outbreak of the campaign was hastened by the desire of the Austrian government to feed their own army and leave a bare country for Napoleon by securing the resources of Bavaria. It was also hoped that the Bavarians with their army of 25,00o men would join the allies. In the latter hope they were deceived, and the Bavarians under General Wrede slipped away to Bamberg in time. In the former, however, they were successful, and the destitution they left in their wake almost wrecked Napoleon's subsequent combinations. Mack's march to Ulm was therefore a necessity of the situation, and his continuance in this exposed position, if foolhardy against such an adversary, was at any rate the outcome of the high resolve that even if beaten he would inflict crippling losses upon the enemy. Mack knew that the Russians would be late at the rendezvous on the Inn. By constructing an entrenched camp at Ulm and concentrating all the available food within it, he expected to compel Napoleon to invest and besiege him, and he anticipated that in the devastated country his adversary would be compelled to separate and thus fall an easy prey to the Russians. For that blow he had determined to make his own army the anvil. But these views obviously could not be pub lished in army orders, hence the discontent and opposition he was destined to encounter.

Movements of the French.

It was on Sept. 21 that Na poleon learnt of Mack's presence in Ulm. On that date his army had crossed the Rhine and was entering the defiles of the Black Forest. It was already beginning to suffer. Boots were worn out, greatcoats deficient, transport almost unattainable and, accord ing to modern ideas, the army would have been considered in capable of action.

On Sept. 26 its deployment beyond the mountains was com plete, and as Napoleon did not know of Mack's intention to stay at Ulm and had learned that the Russian advance had been de layed, he directed his columns by the following roads on the Danube, between Donauworth and Ingolstadt, so as to be in a position to intervene between the Austrians and the Russians and beat both in detail.

On Oct. 7 this movement was completed—the Austrians aban doned the Danube bridges after a show of resistance, retreating westward—and Napoleon, leaving Murat in command of the V. and VI. corps and cavalry to observe the Austrians, pressed on to Augsburg with the others so as to be ready to deal with the Rus sians. Learning, however, that these were still beyond striking radius, he determined to deal with Mack's army first, having formed the fixed conviction that a threat at the latter's communi cations would compel him to endeavour to retreat southwards towards Tirol. Bernadotte in his turn became an army of observa tion, and Napoleon joining Murat with the main body marched rapidly westward from the Lech towards the Iller.

Austrian Plans.

Mack's intentions were not what Napoleon supposed. He had meanwhile received (false) information of a British landing at Boulogne, and he was seriously deceived as to the numbers of Napoleon's forces. He was also aware that the

exactions of the French had produced deep indignation through out Germany and especially in Prussia whose neutrality had been violated. All this, and the almost mutinous discontent of his generals and his enemies of the court circle, shook his resolution of acting as anvil for the Russians, of whose delay also he was aware, and about Oct. 8 he determined to march out north-east ward across the French lines of communication and save his sovereign's army by taking refuge if necessary in Saxony. Be lieving implicitly in the rumours of a descent on Boulogne and of• risings in France which also reached him, and knowing the destitution he had left behind him in his movement to Ulm, when he heard of the westward march of French columns from the Lech he told his army, apparently in all good faith, that the French were in full march for their own country.

Actually the French at this moment were suffering the most terrible distress—up to the Danube they had still found sufficient food for existence, but south of it, in the track of the Austrians, they found nothing. All march discipline disappeared, the men dissolved into hordes of marauders and even the sternest of the marshals wrote piteous appeals to the emperor for supplies, and for permission to shoot some of their stragglers. But to all these Berthier in the emperor's name sent the stereotyped reply— "The emperor has ordered you to carry four days' provisions, therefore you can expect nothing further—you know the em peror's method of conducting war." Action of Albeck or Haslach.—Meanwhile Murat, before the emperor joined him, had given Mack the desired opening. The VI. corps (Ney) should have remained on the left bank of the Danube to close the Austrian exit on that side, but by mistake only Dupont's division had been left at Albeck, the rest being brought over the river. Mack on the 8th had determined to commence his withdrawal, but fortune now favoured the French. The weather during the whole of October had been unusually wet, the swollen Danube overflowed the low ground and the roads had become quagmires. On the south bank, owing to better natural drainage and a drier subsoil, movement was fairly easy, but the Austrians found it almost impossible. On Oct. when they began their march, the road along the Danube was swept into the river, carrying with it several guns and teams, and hours were consumed in passing the shortest distances. At length in the afternoon they suddenly fell upon Dupont's isolated division at Albeck, which was completely surprised and severely handled. The road now lay completely open, but the Austrian columns had so opened out owing to the state of the roads that the leading troops could not pursue their advantage—Dupont rallied and the Austrians had actually to fall back towards Ulm to procure food.