THE CAMPAIGN OF 1805 This may be regarded as a measure of self-defence forced upon Napoleon by the alliance of Russia (April I I), Austria (August 9) and other powers with Great Britain. The possibility had long been before the emperor, and his intention in that event to march straight on Vienna by the valley of the Danube is clearly indi cated in his reply (November 27, 1803) to a Prussian proposal for the neutralization of the South German states. In this he says, "It is on the road from Strasbourg to Vienna that the French must force peace on Austria, and it is this road which you wish us to renounce." When, therefore, on Aug. 25, 1805, he learnt definitely that Villeneuve (see Naval Operations below) had failed in his purpose of securing the command of the Channel, which was the necessary preliminary to the invasion of England, it was but the affair of a few hours to dictate the dispositions necessary to transfer his whole army to the Rhine frontier as the first step in the march which he had determined to make to the Danube. On the date of this decision the army actually lay in the following positions : I. Corps Bernadotte Hanover (Gottingen) II. Marmont Holland III. Davout Camp of Boulogne and IV. Soult V. Lannes other points on the English Channel VI. Ney VII. Augereau Guard Bessieres Paris The corps were, however, by no means fit for immediate service. Bernadotte's corps in Hanover was almost in the position of a beleaguered garrison, and the marshal could only obtain his trans port by giving out that he was ordered to withdraw to France. Marmont and Davout were deficient in horses for cavalry and artillery, and the troops in Boulogne, having been drawn together for the invasion of England, had hardly any transport at all, as it was considered this want could be readily supplied on landing. The composition of the army, however, was excellent. The generals were in the prime of life, had not yet learnt to distrust one another, and were accustomed to work under the emperor and with one another. The regimental officers had all acquired their rank before the enemy and knew how to manage their men, and of the men themselves nearly two-thirds had seen active service. The strength of the army lay in its infantry, for both cavalry and artillery were short of horses, and the latter had not yet acquired mobility and skill in manoeuvring. Napoleon's determination to undertake the invasion of England has often been disputed, but it is hard to imagine what other operation he contemplated, for the outbreak of hostilities with his continental enemies found him ill-supplied with intelligence as to the re sources of the country he had then to traverse. To remedy this,
Murat and other general officers as well as minor agents were sent ahead and instructed to travel through South Germany in plain clothes with a view to collecting information and mastering the topography. The emperor was, moreover, imperfectly ac quainted with the degree of preparation of his adversaries' de signs, and when he dictated his preliminary orders he was still unaware of the direction that the allies' advance would assume. On Aug. 26, however, he learnt that ioo,000 Russians were about to enter Bohemia thence to unite with an Austrian army of 8o,000 near the junction of the Inn and Danube, and this information drove him to alter the general direction of his advance so as to traverse the defiles of the Black Forest north of the Neckar, cavalry only observing the passes to the south.