THE NAPOLEONIC RECORD The Soldier.—We must now briefly consider this man, whose personality was in every respect far above the mean, as a com mander and as a legislator—as soldier and sovereign.
His master concepts may be gathered from his various sayings. "The art of war" he said "is simple and wholly executive. There is nothing ideological about it." And again "The whole art of war consists of a careful and well-thought out defensive, together with a swift and bold offensive." Simplicity and rapidity are the dominating features both of his campaigns and his battles. "The art of war" he said at the beginning of his career "consists, with inferior forces, in always having larger forces than the enemy at the point of attack or defence." To do this rapidity of movement is required. "Energy, rapidity" was his constant admonition to subordinates. One must concentrate one's own forces, keep them together, lead the enemy to give battle in the most unfavourable conditions; then, when his last reserves are engaged, destroy him by a decisive attack and end the war as quickly as possible.
As Napoleon himself said, all these precepts could be corn pressed in a very small book. He had, in fact, a method, not a system. "One of the characteristic features of Napoleonic strategy," says Marshal Franchet d'Esperey, "is that, the goal once chosen and boldly chosen, the method does not vary, though, being supple, it adapts itself to circumstances." One might just as well say "the measure of the method is the commander's measure." Napoleon's power of rapidly summing up a situation and making his decision, explains his victories. As Clausewitz has well said : "On the field of battle everything depends on a decision made in a few minutes." Napoleon summed up everything, in cluding himself, in the words : "No precise rules can be laid down. Everything depends on the character of the general, his abilities, his weakness, the quality of his troops, the range of their weapons, the weather and a thousand other circumstances which never repeat themselves." Hence before the battle his meticulous study of the position, of alternative suppositions, a keen examination of the psychology of his opponent, and the rigorous use of informa tion, material and moral. The weak point was that everything de pended on Napoleon. He saw everything, did everything, took ac count of the most insignificant details, himself directly gave all the orders. His lieutenants, having the habit of obedience, were mere ly executants who took no initiative. Berthier, although he held the position of chief of staff, said that he counted for nothing with the army. Therefore, an indisposition of the emperor was suffi cient to disorganize the machine.
Then, from 1812 onwards, the number of troops involved became too large, and the commander's vision no longer sufficiently sure. It was a war of armies, not of army corps. The Napoleonic system began to give less favourable results. An exaggerated belief in his "star" and his genius, and his heavy demands on an exhausted France, explain the final catastrophe. He had long
profited from the concentration of power in his own person. He himself rejoiced in being almost the only great captain to hold absolute authority over a rich and populous country, and com mand its resources both of men and money. Yet in spite of his enormous intellectual energy he gave way in the end under the burden. He insisted on regulating the minutest details of his government. Thus the decree which still governs the Theatre Francais was signed at Moscow. Moreover his empire was pre carious. Founded on victory and success, it could not survive defeat. Remembering after Waterloo Louis XIV. unshaken by misfortune, he said, "If I had been my own grandson, I could have retreated as far as the Pyrenees." The Sovereign.—Yet he did more than win and lose battles. He gave to France laws which for the most part still endure. We have seen that when he became first consul, France had fallen practically into anarchy. The ancient laws, excessively com plicated, because they differed from province to province and were customary and traditional, had been wiped out by the revolution. The new laws, so far as they existed at all, were too revolutionary in character and unadapted to normal society. The code civil united what in Roman law and in tradition was best suited to France under the conditions engendered by the Revolution. It may be said to be a systemization of good sense, at the same time logical and historical. Napoleon had no legal training, and his share in the work should not be exaggerated, but he intervened continually with the dominating idea that, though the work of the revolution must not be undone, order must be restored in France. Here again he profited by his lack of prejudice and his trained intelligence. He carried out the transition from old to new France. Probably he alone could have re-established the con ditions necessary to settled government without being accused of relinquishing the "civil victories of the revolution." He was able to reimpose indirect taxation and in particular food taxes, the most unpopular of all, the abolition of which had made it impossible to place the finances of the Republic on a sound basis.
The council of state, the public accounts office, the courts of justice, the universities, the rights of the Banque de France, all these were established, counterbalancing the work of the revo lutionary demagogues, and they serve to this day as restraining influences on the occasional over-violence of democracy. On the other side of the picture we see excessive centralization which stifled provincial life and local characteristics, cast the whole country in the same mould, and made the State supreme over the entire people—a system singularly favourable to "etatisme." Thus as a legislator, and as a legendary figure, Napoleon appeared as the restorer of order and authority and the embodiment of progress.