The nearest Turkish force (1,600 infantry with four guns) was located at Magdhaba, some 20M. south of El `Arish. A flying column under Gen. Chauvel, consisting of the Anzac Division and Imperial Camel Corps, was at once despatched against it. After a night march Chauvel attacked the Turks in an entrenched posi tion at dawn on Dec. 23. By late afternoon, at a cost of under 15o casualties, he had accounted for practically the whole enemy force, capturing 1,300 prisoners and burying 10o dead. Only 200 Turks survived the engagement.
The only Turkish force now remaining within the Egyptian frontier was a detachment of about 2,000 near Rafah, 25m. east of El `Arish. This was dealt with in a similar fashion by the mounted troops under Chetwode. After a night march, he sur rounded the Turkish position at dawn on Jan. 9. Some hard fight ing followed, for the Turks were in a strong position and put up a stout defence. It was not till close on dark that the position was assaulted. The entire Turkish force was accounted for, while the British casualties were under Soo. These two brilliant actions cleared the Egyptian province of Sinai from enemy occupation. They were striking examples of the power of boldly handled mounted troops, a power the Turk was to experience very thor oughly before the end of the World War. Murray had now ob tained his original objective, since the possession of Rafah and El `Arish secured the safety of the Suez canal and Egypt.
Towards the end of 1916 he had, however, received instructions which imposed on him a more active role than the mere defence of Egypt. While this defence was still to be the main considera tion, it was made clear to him that the war cabinet expected some more spectacular result of the "Exodus" across the desert than the negative one of giving checkmate to Turkish designs on Egypt.
At the same time they were not prepared to give Murray the ad ditional troops he asked for. Indeed, one of his four divisions, the 42nd, was early in 1917 withdrawn to France, leaving him only three in place of the five which he held to be the minimum to fulfil the role demanded of him. He had the nucleus of a fourth division—the 74th—to be formed from dismounted yeomanry ; and the liquidation of the western campaign enabled him to add a second mounted division to the force on the Palestine border.
The situation in the early spring of 1917 was this: railhead was close to the Egyptian frontier at Rafa, some 20M. from Gaza ; the British war cabinet's policy for the Egyptian theatre had finally crystallized into instructions to Sir Archibald Murray to prepare during the summer for an offensive campaign into Pales tine in the autumn ; and the Turk—now definitely on the defen sive—had suddenly evacuated a forward position which he had prepared at Shellal, and had sketched out a position for the defence of Palestine between Gaza and Beersheba.
It was decided therefore in March to attempt the capture of Gaza by a coup de main similar to those at Rafah and Magdhaba, but on a much larger scale. The difficulties of concentration, of supply and of secrecy were of course much increased by the ne cessity to employ infantry in addition to mounted troops. The Turks had at the time some 7,00o fighting troops in Gaza, another 7,00o at Tel esh Sheri`a, half-way between Gaza and Beersheba, and a small garrison in Beersheba.
The plan was, briefly, for the mounted troops to pass east of Gaza, cut the garrison's line of retreat, and hold off the arrival of any Turkish reinforcements from the north or east. The 53rd Division was to assault the heights east and south of Gaza, while the 54th Division protected the exposed right flank from the direction of Tel esh Sheri`a.