Il the Sinai Desert

Attacks on Gaza.

The enterprise took place on March 26. Unfortunately, a dense sea fog came up with the dawn and caused a delay of two precious hours in the deployment of the infantry. This delay, which could not have been foreseen nor prevented, was the direct cause of the loss of the battle. For the Turkish position was strong, and it was not till 5 P.M. that the 53rd Divi sion secured the 'Ali el Muntar ridge which dominates Gaza from the east ; at the same time, a part of the mounted troops were in the north-eastern outskirts of the town. The victory was to all appearances won. In fact the garrison, as was afterwards known, was on the point of surrender. But Turkish reinforcements from the north and east were already pressing on the protective screen of the mounted troops ; the horses were without water, and dark ness was coming on. It had been agreed beforehand that the en terprise should be abandoned if Gaza had not fallen by dark. The reports received did not indicate a successful issue ; owing to a breakdown of communications, news of the success of the 53rd Division did not reach the British commander till about 11 P.M. Sir Charles Dobell hesitated to involve his infantry in the intri cate network of cactus hedges which surrounds Gaza, while Chet wode was against exposing his mounted troops, exhausted by want of water, to the danger of being overwhelmed by the approaching Turkish reinforcements. The withdrawal of the mounted troops was ordered. This exposed the right of the 53rd Division, which had to be drawn back from the 'Ali el Muntar heights to gain touch with the left of the 54th. The battle was resumed next morning, but the Turkish garrison had been reinforced and had taken heart of grace at the unexpected respite of the previous evening. It was found impossible again to make good the 'Ali el Muntar ridge, the key to Gaza; and finally the whole force was withdrawn to the Wadi Ghazze.

This first battle of Gaza has been a matter of dispute and con jecture. By many of the troops who took part, it was held that the decision to withdraw threw away a victory already won. On

the other hand, it is impossible to question that in the circum stances the order for retirement was justified. The two-hour delay in the morning lost the battle. Other contributory causes were the breakdown of communications (partly due to shortness of equipment) and lack of accurate maps, which made it impossible for H.Q. to obtain timely information of the progress of the fight.

Though the enterprise had failed, the force had secured a posi tion on the Wadi Ghazze which would enable railhead to be ad vanced to within a short distance of Gaza in preparation for the autumn campaign. Murray now, however, received instructions to commence an offensive movement at once. A fresh assault on Gaza was therefore prepared. But the conditions were now very different ; the Turk had closed the gap between Gaza and Beer sheba by a series of works, and had greatly extended and strength ened the defences of Gaza. He had some five divisions in line and a considerable quantity of heavy artillery, so that Gen. Dobell's force had no easy task. Much hope was placed in some tanks, which were to be used in Eastern warfare for the first time. The attack was made in two stages, of which the first, on April 17, was designed to gain a position from which the final thrust on Gaza could be made. It was successful. But the decisive attack on April 19 failed with heavy loss; the tanks developed mechanical defects in the heavy sand or were put out of action by the well placed Turkish guns ; and the weight of artillery supporting the British attack was insufficient to demolish the formidable defences of Gaza. The British casualties were 7,000.

Operations before Gaza now settled into regular trench warfare. The Sinai campaign was at an end. It had fulfilled its object : the security of Egypt ; and the careful and thorough organization which had conquered the desert had laid a solid foundation for the future British successes. For this Sir Archibald Murray deserves the greatest credit. He had never been given the number of troops necessary for more extended successes.