Organization.—The Sassanid ruler is the representative of the "Kingly Majesty," derived from Ormuzd, which appears in the Avesta as the angel Kavaem Hvareno, "the royal glory," and, according to legend, once beamed in the Iranian kings, un attainable to all but those of royal blood. A sculpture, which frequently recurs in the rock-reliefs of Ardashir I. and Shapur I., represents the king and the god Ormuzd both on horseback, the latter in the act of handing to his companion the ring of sov ereignty. Thus it is explicable that all the Sassanids, as many of the Arsacids before them, include the designation of "god" in their formal style. From this developed (as already under the Arsacids) that strict principle of legitimacy which is still vigorous in Firdousi. It applies, however, to the whole royal house, pre cisely as it did later in the Ottoman empire. The person of the individual ruler is a matter of indifference. He can readily be removed and replaced by another ; but no usurper who was not of the legitimate blood can hope to become the genuine king. Therefore the native tradition carries the Sassanid line back to the Achaemenids and, still further, to the kings of the legendary period.
Officially the king is all-powerful, and his will, which is guided by God and bound up in His law, unfettered. Thus, externally, he is surrounded by all the splendour of sovereignty; on his head he wears a great and resplendent crown, with a high circular centre-piece; he is clothed in gold and jewels; round him is a brilliant court, composed of his submissive servants. He sits in dazzling state on his throne in Ctesiphon. All who would ap proach fling themselves to the ground, life and death depend on his nod. Among his people he is accounted the fairest, strongest and wisest man of the empire; and from him is required the practice of all piety and virtue, as well as skill in the chase and in arms—especially the bow. Ardashir I., moreover, and his successors endeavoured to establish the validity of the royal will by absorbing the vassal states and instituting a firmer or ganization. Nevertheless they failed to attain the complete inde pendence and power of the Achaemenids. Not strong enough to break up the nobility, with its great estates, they were forced to utilize its services and still further to promote its interests; while their dependence on its good-will and assistance led inev itably to incessant gifts of money, lands and men. This state of affairs had also prevailed under the later Achaemenids, and had materially contributed to the disintegration of the empire and the numerous insurrections of the satraps.
But the older Achaemenids held an entirely different position; and hardly a single Sassanid enjoyed even that degree of power which was still retained by the later Achaemenids. It was of
fundamental importance that the Sassanian empire could not make good its claim to world dominion; and, in spite of the title of its kings, it always remained essentially the kingdom of Iran— or rather West Iran, together with the districts on the Tigris and Euphrates. This fact, again, is most closely connected with its military and administrative organization. The external and internal conditions of the empire are in mutual reaction upon one another. The empire, which in extent did not exceed that of the Arsacids with its vassal states, was protected on the east and west by the great deserts of central Iran and Mesopotamia. For the defence of these provinces the mounted archers, who formed the basis of the army, possessed adequate strength; and though the Scythian nomads from the east, or the Romans from the west, might occasionally penetrate deep into the coun try, they never succeeded in maintaining their position. But the power of the neo-Persian empire was not great enough for f ur ther conquests, though its army was capable and animated by a far stronger national feeling than that of the Parthians. It still consisted, however, of levies from the retinue of the mag nates led by their territorial lords ; and, although these troops would stream in at the beginning of a war, they could not be kept permanently together. For, on the one hand, they were actuated by the most varied personal interests and antipathies, not all of which the king could satisfy ; on the other hand he could not, owing to the natural character and organization of his dominions, maintain and pay a large army for any length of time. Thus the great hosts soon melted away, and a war, begun successfully, ended ingloriously, and often disastrously. Under such circumstances an elaborate tactical organization employ ing different species of arms, or the execution of a comprehensive plan of campaign, was out of the question. The successes of the Sassanids in the east were gained in the later period of their dominion ; and the Roman armies, in spite of decay in disci pline and military spirit, still remained their tactical and strate gical superiors. A great victory might be won—even an em peror might be captured, like Valerian—but immediately of ter wards successes, such as those gained against Shapur I. (who was certainly an able general) by Ballista and Odenathus of Pal myra, or the later victories of Carus, Julian and others, demon strated how far the Persians were from being on an equality with the Romans. That Babylonia permanently remained a Sassanian province was due merely to the geographical conditions and to the political situation of the Roman empire, not to the strength of the Persians.