PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY Mediaeval philosophers were for the most part Christian theo logians, and a detailed history of their views belongs to the history of Christian dogma rather than to the history of phil osophy. Here our business is only with the limited philosophical aspect of that complex and interesting story. Christianity did not set out to be a philosophy, but a moral and religious stimulus. Its interest was in the lowly rather than in the "high-brow." It was suspicious of philosophy and uttered a warning against it. "Take heed lest there shall be any one that maketh spoil of you through his philosophy" (Col. ii., 8). And at least one Apostolic Father (Tertullian) not only did not mind it if his faith was unphilosophical, but was almost proud of it—credo quia absurdum. In course of time, however, it was found necessary to make use of philosophy partly in order to repel the attacks of hostile philosophers, partly in order to spread the gospel among phil osophically-minded heathens, and partly in order to satisfy the needs or tastes of Christians with a turn for philosophy. Early in the 2nd century already Alexandrian Christians, like Alexan drian Jews, resorted to allegorical Neo-Platonist interpretations, as is clear from the "Logos" doctrine in the so-called Gospel of St. John. Some of the "Gnostics" even tried to combine loyalty to Jesus with loyalty to Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle. For some time, however, the chief use made of philosophy was for purposes of defence (apologetics). This was the case with the Church Fathers, notably Justin Martyr (d. 167), Tertullian (150- 220), Clemens of Alexandria (d. 215), Origen and, above all, Augustine The Patristic period, as it is called, is characterized by its Platonic or Neo-Platonist tendency, for which the influence of Augustine secured a certain predominance in Christian thought for a long time afterwards. Augustine had been a sceptic, among other things, before he became a saint, so he felt it necessary to refute scepticism before attempting a constructive philosophy.
His method was that adopted later by Descartes. There are many things, he said, that are dubious. But there is one thing that is indubitable even in the state of doubt, namely, the actual experience of doubting. And one could not doubt unless he was alive and thinking, and aware that there is such a thing as truth. So we are certain of something. But how? Not by external per ception but by inner intuition. Augustine next proceeds, like Plato, to distinguish two types of reality—an "intelligible world" (of "ideas" or "forms") which is apprehended by intuition, and a "sensible world" (of mere "copies" or "imitations" of the "ideas") which is apprehended in sense-perception. Intuition affords real "knowledge"; sense-perception, mere opinion. Eternal truths (like those of mathematics, for example) are objective and transcendental. They are emanations or radiations from God. The human soul may apprehend them, but does not create them. God, then, is the source of the eternal truths. He creates things by thinking them; and He has created the world out of nothing. But things were not all made by Him directly. God only created matter and endowed it with the seeds of further development. With such changes time came into being; but God is beyond time --He is eternal. Temporal things only endure so long as God maintains them by continuous creation. Man is a miraculous union of an "intelligible" and a "sensible" substance. The soul, as the possessor of eternal truths, is immortal.
Patristic philosophy attained its climax in Augustine, and little else of the thought of that period, and for several centuries afterwards, is of sufficient philosophical interest to be worth mention in a mere outline of the history of philosophy. As a whole Christendom relapsed into intellectual darkness, and did not open its eyes again until several centuries afterwards.