PHARNABAZUS, Persian soldier and statesman, the son of Pharnaces, belonged to a family which from 478 B.C. governed the satrapy of Phrygia on the Hellespont, from its headquarters at Dascylium. Pharnabazus first appears as satrap of this province in 413, when he entered into negotiations with Sparta and began war with Athens. After the war he came into conflict with Lysander (q.v.: see also PELOPONNESIAN WAR), who tried to keep the Greek cities under his own dominion, and became one of the causes of his overthrow, by a letter which he sent to the ephors at Sparta.
When in 399 the war with Sparta broke out he again tried to conduct it strenuously. With the help of Conon and Evagoras of Salamis he organized the Persian fleet, and while he was hard pressed on land by Agesilaus he prepared the decisive sea-battle, which was fought in August 394 at Cnidus under his and Conon's command, and completely destroyed the Spartan fleet. He sent support to the allies in Greece, by which the walls of the Peiraeus were rebuilt. But in the war on land he struggled in vain against the lethargy and disorganization of the Persian Empire ; and when at last, in 387, in consequence of the embassy of Antalcidas to Susa, the king decided to conclude peace with Sparta and to enter again into close alliance with her, Pharnabazus, the principal opponent of Sparta, was recalled from his command in high hon ours, to marry Apame, a daughter of the king (Plut. Artax. 27).
In 385 Pharnabazus was one of the generals sent against Egypt, and in 377 he was ordered to prepare a new expedition against the valley of the Nile. The gathering of the army took years, and when in 373 all was ready, his attempt to force the passage of the Nile failed. A conflict with Iphicrates, the leader of the Greek mercenaries, increased the difficulties ; at last Pharnabazus led the army back to Asia. When he died is not known. (ED. M.) o PHARSALUS, BATTLE OF (48 B.c.). The defeat sus tained by Julius Caesar at Dyrrachium in May 48 B.C. in no way disheartened him, but it compelled him to change his plan, and that at once. The task before him was a difficult one, namely to retire before a victorious enemy and cross two bridgeless rivers, the Genusus and Apsus. Leaving 15 cohorts and 30o vessels to guard Dyrrachium, on June 3 Pompey set out towards Heraclea whilst Caesar made his way to Aeginium in Thessaly where he was joined by Cn. Domitius and two legions; this brought his force up to nine, some 24,00o men. He moved eastwards and camped north-west of Pharsalus in the plain on the left bank of the Enipeus. There he awaited his enemy whose army numbered 50,000 infantry, 7,00o cavalry and a large number of light troops. Pompey felt certain of victory, but he overlooked the personal factor and forgot that Caesar was his army, and that as one writer says: "The whole body was instinct with his purpose." Caesar felt equally certain of success. The battle was fought on June 29.
Pompey planned to hold Caesar's front with his infantry and mass his cavalry, largely outnumbering Caesar's, on his left wing in order to envelop Caesar's right wing and attack it in rear. Pompey's right wing rested on the river Enipeus and was pro tected not only by the steep banks but by a force of some 600 horsemen, as Caesar saw. It was under the command of Lentulus, and was composed of Cilician and Spanish troops good soldiers. His left wing numbered the I. and III. legions and
was accompanied by Pompey in person. Scipio held the centre with two Syrian legions and the bulk of the cavalry, slingers and archers, under Labienus were massed on the outer flank of the left wing.
Caesar drew up his legions in three lines of cohorts, four in the first, three in the second and three in the third ; his men stood eight deep. On the right he placed the X. legion and on the left the IX. Antony commanded the left, Sylla the right and Cn. Domitius the centre ; he himself took up his position opposite Pompey. Thus far his order of battle was normal, but he had noticed the large force of cavalry massed on his enemy's left. Recognising that this mass was intended to outflank him, he drew up a fourth line of chosen cohorts, taken from the third line, and placed six of these cohorts and his small force of horse on his right, telling them that on their courage would depend the results of the battle. The third line he proposed to hold in reserve, and the first and second he ordered not to charge until he required it to. The trum pets were then sounded, and the battle cry of "Venus Victrix" raised, to which the Pompeians answered : "Hercules Invictus." Pompey had ordered his men to await the enemy's assault, for he considered that when the two forces clinched his troops would be the fresher ; but Caesar realising that this was a sign of weak ness ordered his legions forward, trusting as he did to the impetus of the charge inspiring them with courage. Mid-way his men paused to regain breath, then advanced again, and when within range the front rank men hurled their javelins and drawing their swords rushed forward, and the two lines clinched. Immediately Pompey launched his cavalry and archers against his enemy's right flank, driving Caesar's cavalry from the field. Then the fourth line came into play, and in place of casting their javelins they closed on the horsemen with the sword "striking at the horses' breasts, and the men's legs and faces." In spite of their numbers the horsemen turned and fled, and the fourth line falling upon the archers and slingers drove them back, then, wheeling to the left, they struck Pompey's front, now locked in battle, on its flank and rear. At once Caesar galloped to his third line and or dered it to advance. This it did, breaking through Pompey's front. When Pompey saw his cavalry routed, despairing of success, he fled to his camp, possibly to rally the fugitives. The camp was eventually assaulted and taken, whereupon Pompey and 3o horse fled to Larissa and embarked for Egypt, where later on he was assassinated by Ptolemy Auletes, or rather by his tutor the eunuch Photinus, for Ptolemy was but a boy of ten. In this battle Caesar lost 3o centurions and 200 men killed, and Pompey 15,000 killed and 24,00o prisoners. Caesar for political reasons showed great clemency by proclaiming a general pardon. He then organised his prisoners into two new legions and sent them to Asia.
Commentaries; the Catiline of Sallust; the Pharsalia of Lucan ; and the histories of Appian, Dio Cassius and Velleius Paterculus ; Mommsen, History of Rome; A. Holm, History of Greece; Col. Stoffel, Histoire de Jules Cesar; guerre civile (1887) ; T. A. Dodge, Caesar (1892) ; J. A. Froude, Caesar, a Sketch (1896) ; G. Ferrero, Greatness and Decline of Rome (1907) ; W. W. Fowler, Julius Caesar (1909) . (J. F. C. F.)