War.—The history of the wars with France is discussed under FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY WARS, NAPOLEONIC CAMPAIGNS, NA POLEON ; FRANCE, etc. It is only possible here to estimate generally the part that Pitt played in the organization of Europe. It has long been a current cliché to say that Pitt was a great peace minis ter and a poor war minister. But if Pitt's talents were indeed essentially suited to peace, it is equally true that Napoleon was finally encompassed in disaster by the dogged determination of the English premier, and of ter his death by the remembered influence of that resolution. To compare him with his father is idle; Chat ham had every advantage. His allies were great commanders, his France was effete. But revolutionary France was inspired with a fanatic hope, and England's continental allies proved continually worthless. Year after year Pitt laboured to sustain his coalitions of the Powers ; year after year the coalitions melted away before the victorious advances of the French. England, who had no call to be anything but a member of a general European league against France was forced to be the inspiration as well financially as politi cally of the entire organization.
Home Policy.—At home the war changed entirely the tranquil prospects of national wealth and prosperity. New voices were in the air—voices of political discontent, and shortly the voices too of hunger. Pitt's policy at home at this juncture is of great importance. Because he never again brought forward the ques tion of reform after his failure in 1785, and opposed it whenever it was proposed by others, his sincerity has been openly called in question. His actions certainly demand some explanation. It is in the first place important to admit that there was as yet no national enthusiasm for reform : the cry had been raised largely in protest against the unconstitutional behaviour of the king, and had been lulled since the declaration of peace; moreover those who had been foremost in urging "economical reform" had no such belief in the necessity of parliamentary reform. A states man—especially one on whom practically the whole conduct of a Government devolves—can not persist in a measure which has been again and again rejected in one form or another. Pitt had a large majority. But the fact that he remained in office for so long has obscured the truth that he was to a very large extent dependent upon the caprices of that majority. A contemporary political estimate recorded the number of those gentlemen who "would probably support his majesty's Government"—roughly the Court Party—as more than three times the size of Pitt's personal party : and there was a further shifting and entirely independent vote. For all his dominance of the House Pitt was
sometimes defeated—over the Westminster petition (see Fox, CHARLES JAMES), over Ireland, over his proposals in 1786 to fortify Plymouth and Portsmouth. The demand for reform was not seriously supported in the House of Commons. More impor tant still it was not as yet properly vocal outside its walls.
In 1792 Tom Paine's Rights of Man had been published, sud denly jolting the English Radical movement into a new mind at the moment when the French doctrines were filtering into England in a fashion admittedly designed to provoke dissensions. The circumstances had become altered. Pitt's refusal to support the motion for the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts in 1789 and 1790 was unintelligibly craven ; but when he refused to sup port Grey in 1792 he had excuse. "The hurricane season" had set in. Pitt allowed himself to be stampeded by a species of panic which was entirely unjustified by the facts. Talleyrand at this time remarked that those curiously deceived themselves who believed that England was on the verge of revolution. He was a more shrewd observer of truth—but it must be admitted that he had the advantage of looking at Britain not only in perspective but also dispassionately. Deceived or not, Pitt declared that this was no time to revise a constitution, and proceeded to punish severely any who should advocate reform doctrines. It was lam entable ; it was essentially unjust; and there is but one excuse— the excuse which in sympathy has condoned many shameful persecutions, when things are done in panic which are never justified by the patent facts but are believed to be necessary for profound reasons of State that can only be guessed at.
In 1793, and again in 1795-1801 Habeas Corpus was suspended, and bills for the suppression of sedition followed. There suc ceeded the trials and transportations of men like Skirving, Mar garot, Gerrald, Muir, condemned for nothing more treasonable than advocating parliamentary reform or universal suffrage. So cieties for constitutional reform were raided and suppressed. It is unpleasant to find that the records of the confiscated papers of those clubs reveal without exception nothing indicative of revo lutionary organization. And yet in 1795 Pitt declared that were he to resign he would lose his head within six months. The cir cumstances were extraordinary, and it is just to suppose that Pitt was honest : he was not the less grievously wrong.