Addington had won a great victory at the general election, but it was not long before his policy began to drift towards perilous courses. When it was clear that a rupture of the peace was im minent, Pitt was approached, but he no longer felt that Adding ton's policy could receive his honest support, and later negotia tions provoked so wide and insistent divergencies of mind upon the personnel of a possible cabinet as to make agreement impos sible and even to interrupt an ancient friendship. War broke out again on May 16, 1803. Against the insufficient programme of the ministry Pitt opposed a vigorous policy in a speech (May 23) which provoked the enthusiasm of all parties. But while the cleavage was growing plainer and plainer Pitt yet refused directly to oppose Addington, to whom he had promised his support. The situation was becoming increasingly serious. In the face of the growing danger of invasion the measures of the Government were entirely inadequate, and early in 1804 Pitt was forced into stronger opposition. Complicated once again by a threatened relapse of the king, negotiations for a stronger administration were protracted. The ministry was doomed when a motion of Fox's for a committee of enquiry into the national defences was powerfully supported by Pitt, and after some days of negotiation he returned as chancellor of the exchequer aad first lord of the treasury on May i o.
possibility of invasion; but the year closed in disaster. The capit ulation of Ulm (Oct. 20) was succeeded by Austerlitz (Dec 2).
At first Pitt was able to doubt the full implications of the news; but, gradually as despatches authenticated the reports he came to realize that the mighty coalition was hopelessly broken. Eng land had saved herself by her exertions, he had remarked at the Lord Mayor's banquet in the previous November: she would save Europe by her example. And now Napoleon stood without a force to oppose him upon the whole continent ; and Pitt, with prophetic accuracy, was brought to the bitter admission that the map of Europe would "not be wanted these ten years." On Jan. 23, 18°6, he died, and if his last words were not "My country How I leave my country!" his thoughts can have been none other. Constitutional Importance.—The period of Pitt's govern ment covered a supremely important moment of political transi tion. It was also a period of a not less important crystallization of British constitutional doctrine. It would be wrong-headed to at tribute that growth too strongly to Pitt's political acumen. Both the length, and the critical instant, of his ministry made develop ment natural and inevitable. He was placed in the position of leadership at precisely the tactical moment. The fruit was ripe: but it was the harvest of a century of other men's labours. Pitt was the first Hanoverian minister to appeal definitely from the vote of the House of Commons to the vote of the constituencies, and throughout his career his strength was derived from the pub lic confidence. In his colleagues Pitt appeared to prefer industry to genius. If this was partly because of an exaggerated sense of his own authority, it must also be remembered that the choice was also one of necessity. Pitt did overshadow his colleagues—but it was no difficult task. The result contributed to his general theory that the independence of Government departments was impossible.
They must rather be bound together with a corporate policy, re sponsible to the Crown under a common allegiance to the prime minister. Walpole, who is generally considered the first prime minister, denied the title, and was succeeded by Governments which could only exist under the leadership of duumvirates and triumvirates. Pitt not only claimed the title of prime minister but declared that the office was essential to sane government. In 1803, when negotiations were on foot for a ministry in which the authority should be shared by himself and Addington, he stated that it was "an absolute necessity that there should be an avowed and real- minister, possessing the Chief Weight in the Council and the principal place in the confidence of the King; in that re spect there can be no rivalry or division of power. It must rest in the person generally called first minister, who ought to be at the head of the finances." And if a difference of opinion arose "the sentiments of the minister must be understood to prevail." This view moreover was widely understood by contemporary com mentators. In 1794 when Lord Fitzwilliam went to Ireland he was pledged to support the Government "considering Mr. Pitt as the Prime Minister without whom no material measure as to Things or persons is to be concerted or done" (Carlisle Papers); and the Glenbervie Diary (Dec. 30, 1798) corroborates this lan guage. In everything Pitt laboured to assert the authority of the cabinet, and of the premier within the cabinet. He was the king's minister; but not the minister of the king's policy. The theory was thrashed out over small details. Pitt claimed, for instance, that the Crown must follow his recommendations in the nomi nations of bishops, and when the king refused to concur de clared that he would take it as a decisive mark of lack of con fidence.