RECENT AND CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY Neo-Hegelianism.—Until comparatively recently, British phi losophy pursued its own course in almost entire independence of Continental philosophy. Its most characteristic feature was its initial empiricism, though it ended variously in agnosticism, scepticism or even in idealism. Wheri the widespread influence of Kant's critical philosophy asserted itself, it was still used mainly to supplement the agnostic tendencies of native empiri cism. In view of Kant's own indebtedness to Hume, this was not unnatural. Anyway, Kant's denial of the possibility of knowl edge of things as they are in themselves, and its limitation to phenomena could readily be identified with Locke's and Hume's denial of our knowledge of "substances" and its restriction to "ideas." The philosophical agnosticism of Hamilton (1788-1856), Man sel (182o-71), Spencer and Huxley (1825-95) may thus be regarded as betraying Continental influence only to a slight ex tent. The influence of German voluntarism was no greater, probably rather less. Martineau (1805-190o) was probably the only one in his generation to identify God, or the ultimate cause of the universe, with Will. The influence of German Absolute Idealism, however, was much more marked, especially in the logical form in which it was developed by Hegel. It cannot be asserted that Hegelianism had actual followers in England or in America. But Hegelianism harmonized well with the growing revolt against empiricism, and so some of the acutest thinkers in both countries were influenced by it sufficiently to be com monly described as Neo-Hegelians. The most important repre sentatives of the group were Green (1836-82), Bradley (1846 1924), Bosanquet (1848-1923), Haldane (1856-1928) and Mc Taggaft (1866-1925) in England, and Royce (1855-1916) in America—to say nothing of the many well-known representatives who are happily still living. Considering the logical or rational character of Hegel's idealism, it is natural to find that at least two of the Neo-Hegelians have made most important contribu tions to logic, which they treated in a highly epistemological man ner (Bradley's Principles of Logic, and Bosanquet's Logic). Neo Hegelianism is essentially a metaphysic of logical coherence, involving a doctrine of varying grades or degrees of reality. Real ity, according to Bradley, is in the last resort a system of experi ence. The finite as such is not illusory, yet not absolutely real, only relatively so : it is entirely dependent upon, and rests within, the Absolute, or entire system of experience. In the broad sense in which the term Neo-Hegelian is here used it may also be ap plied to the two Italian philosophers, Croce (1866– ) and Gentile (1875– ), the Dutch philosopher Bolland 1922), and the German Volkelt (1848-1930). (See NE0 HEGELIANISM.) Pragmatism as a method of evaluating ideas by their practical consequences was formulated by C. S. Peirce (1839-1914) in 1878, and developed more fully by W. James (1842-191o), J.
Dewey (1859– ) and F. C. S. Schiller (1864-1937). The movement is based partly on psychological considerations, and partly on a dissatisfaction with the intellectualism and deter ministic monism of absolute idealism. "Thinking," according to
James, "is first and last and always for the sake of doing," and "the conception with which we handle a bit of sensible experience is really nothing but a teleological instrument." The agnostic or relativist side of Kant's teaching, as developed by Nietzsche and Vaihinger in some ways encouraged the substitution of the prac tically useful for the theoretically true as the standard of value for beliefs. And German voluntarism tended in the same direction. "The 'true,' " according to James, "is only the expedient in the way of thinking, just as the 'right' is only the expedient in the way of behaving." In the circumstances, it was natural that the effort at self-preservation characteristic of finite individuals should express itself in favour of a belief in the ultimate reality and worth of a plurality of finite beings, as against their merely relative being and worth in a monistic "block-universe." Hence the combination of pragmatism with pluralism. (See PRAGMATISM; PLURALISM; TRUTH.) The New Realism.—In Germany it was idealism that pro voked materialism, and materialism occasioned that revival of epistemological interest which produced Neo-Kantianism. With British and American philosophy the case is rather different. It was the materialistic tendencies of empiricism, agnosticism and evolutionism that provoked the idealism of the Neo-Hegelians, and the new realistic tendencies in epistemology have come as a revolt against idealism generally, and subjective idealism more particularly. The present movement was started mainly by G. E. Moore and B. Russell, and has been taken up eagerly by many others in Britain and in America. These thinkers differ in their views in some respects, but they agree in their endeavour to vindicate the independent reality of the objects of human knowl edge, and especially of the objects apprehended in perception. (See KNOWLEDGE, THEORY OF.) Bergson (1859– ) is the founder of what is variously known as the philosophy of change, of creative evolution, or of duration. Like so many idealist philosophers, his main aim is to vindicate the spiritual principle in nature and freedom in human nature against the mechanistic tendencies of modern science. Somewhat like Fichte he conceives of ultimate reality as some thing less determinate than consciousness or matter, but from which both consciousness and matter are derived. This ultimate reality is an incessant flux, a creative evolution, or real duration. It is not an inaccessible absolute; it. can be apprehended by man. "In the absolute we live and move and have our being. The knowledge we possess of it is incomplete, no doubt, but not external or relative. It is reality itself, in the profoundest mean ing of the word, that we reach by the combined and progressive development of science and philosophy." Materiality and spirit uality are resultants of processes in opposite directions. Spirit uality is the process of concentrated activity in which the past interpenetrates the present ; materiality corresponds to a relaxa tion of this activity.