Schopenhauer Pessimism

SCHOPENHAUER ; PESSIMISM.) Fechner (1801-87) developed the philosophy known as Pan psychism, that is, the view that the universe is a system or so ciety of souls, of which God is the highest and all-comprehensive soul. According to Fechner material bodies are souls as they appear to other souls, whereas each soul as experienced from within is psychical. In this way he tried to save the reality of matter as well as of mind in psychophysical entities of which they are the outer and the inner side respectively. But he regarded the two sides as parallel without any interaction ; and it was largely due to his influence that many psychologists adopted psy chophysical parallelism as the working hypothesis in psychology. Fechner tried to combine pantheism with something sufficiently like the monadology of Leibniz to safeguard the interests of finite souls. He identified God with the soul of the universe, and regarded it as embracing all other souls just as larger bodies contain smaller bodies, and nature contains them all. (See FECH NER ; PSYCHOLOGY, HISTORY OF.) Lotze (1817-81) elaborated a philosophy which may be described as idealistic pantheism. In other words ultimate reality, according to him, is like Spinoza's substance, with thought (or consciousness) for its sole attribute. He agreed with Kant that all known things are merely sensible phenomena ; but he re jected Kant's unknown "things in themselves." He agreed with Leibniz in regarding spiritual monads as the causes of material phenomena ; but he rejected the view that the monads are sub stances. The monads, according to Lotze, are only modes or modifications of the one and infinite Substance, God. The inter action of the monads he reduced to the immanent causality of God, who is the sole real cause or agent. The mechanistic char acter of phenomena Lotze explained by saying that God carries out His immanent activities in accordance with uniform laws. These laws, however, are subordinate to divine ends, the system being teleological as well as mechanistic in part. Human souls, like other monads, are not substances, but modes or activities of the one Substance. Lotze repudiated the method of Hegelian

idealism as unscientific. But he tried to save all such idealistic elements as he considered to be in harmony with science and human experience. (See LOTZE ; LOGIC, HISTORY OF.) A philo sophy essentially like that of Lotze was taught by James Ward (1843-1925) who had studied under him.

Hartmann

(1842-1906) adopted and developed Schopen hauer's voluntarism and pessimism. For Schopenhauer reality is essentially will which produces knowledge or representation as an instrument for its satisfaction. For Hartmann, however, repre sentation is on a level with, not subordinate to, will. Together they constitute the "unconscious," which is the "absolute" in his system. With the development of the unconscious its two components differentiate gradually, and the unconscious becomes conscious, even self-conscious, and realizes the tragedy of the will to live. The remedy is so to set the two components of the unconscious, will and representation, into mutual antagonism as to secure eventually their mutual annihilation and eternal peace from the restless and unsatisfying pursuits of life. (See HART MANN.) Nietzsche (1844-1900) was influenced chiefly by Kant, Scho penhauer and Darwin. He agreed with Schopenhauer's main theses but drew a different moral from them. Nietzsche, even more than Schopenhauer, so interpreted Kant's theory of knowl edge as to deny the very possibility of knowledge, and to reduce all so-called knowledge to mere fiction or artistry. The human mind, in the very act of apprehending reality, transforms it. "Truth (says Nietzsche) is not something which is already there to be found or discovered ; it is something which has to be cre ated"—it is "man-made," as the Pragmatists said after him. This does not mean that he lumps all human beliefs together indis criminately. Only in place of the usual distinction between "true" beliefs and "false" ones, Nietzsche would substitute the distinc tion between those which are "useful" and those which are not, but without in any way holding that the useful is true, even as a matter of probability.