PRAGMATISM, in philosophy, a theory or method of deal ing with real things (Gr. rpitypara: cf. rpa-yyarucOs versed in affairs). "Pragmatic," as here employed is not used in the common colloquial sense of "pragmatical," i.e., "fussy and positive," nor in the historical sense, as in "Pragmatic Sanction," of "relating to affairs of state," but in the sense of practical or efficient. Prag matism, as a general philosophic doctrine or mental attitude, can only be understood as part of a reaction against the intellectual istic speculation which has characterized most of modern meta physics. It arises from a general awakening to the fact that the growth of our psychological and biological knowledge must pro foundly transform the traditional epistemology. It follows that "pragmatic" lines of thought may originate from a multiplicity of considerations and in a variety of contexts. These, however, may be conveniently classified under four main heads—psychological, logical, ethical and religious—and the history of the subject shows that all these have contributed to the development of pragmatism.
I. Psychologically, pragmatism starts from the efficacy and all pervasiveness of mental activity, and points out that interest, attention, selection, purpose, bias, desire, emotion, satisfaction, etc., colour and control all our cognitive processes. It insists that all thought is personal and purposive and that "pure" thought is a figment. A judgment which is not prompted by motives and inspired by interest, which has not for its aim the satisfaction of a cognitive purpose, is psychologically impossible, and it is, there fore, mistaken to construct a logic which abstracts from all these facts. Nor is the presence of such non-intellectual factors in thinking necessarily deleterious : at any rate they are ineradicable.
2. In its logical aspect pragmatism originates in a criticism of fundamental conceptions like "truth," "error," "fact" and "real ity," the current accounts of which it finds untenable or unmean ing. "Truth," for example, cannot be defined as the agreement or correspondence of thought with "reality," for how can thought de termine whether it correctly "copies" what transcends it? Nor can our truth be a copy of a transcendent and absolute truth (Dewey). If it be asked, therefore, what such phrases mean, it is found that their meaning is really defined by their use. The real difference between two conceptions lies in their application, in the different consequences for the purposes. of life which their acceptance carries. When no such "practical" difference can be found, con ceptions are identical; when they will not "work," i.e., when they
thwart the purpose which demanded them, they are false ; when they are inapplicable they are unmeaning (A. Sidgwick). Hence the "principle of Peirce" may be formulated as being that "every truth has practical consequences, and these are the test of its truth." It is clear that this (I) implicitly considers truth as a value, and so connects it with the conception of good, and (2) openly raises the question—What is truth, and how is it to be distinguished from error? This accordingly becomes the central problem of pragmatism. This same issue also arises independently out of the breakdown of rationalistic theories of knowledge (F. H. Bradley, H. H. Joachim). Logical analysis, after assuming that truth is independent and not of our making, has to confess that all logical operations involve an apparently arbitrary interference with their data (Bradley).
3. The ethical affinities of pragmatism spring from the percep tion that all knowing is referred to a purpose. This at once renders it "useful," i.e., a means to an end or "good." Completely "use less" knowledge becomes impossible, though the uses of knowledge may still vary greatly in character, in directness, and in the extent and force of their appeal to different minds. This relation to a "good" must not, however, be construed as a doctrine of ethics in the narrower sense; nor is its "utilitarianism" to be confused with the hedonism of the British associationists. "Useful" means "good for an (any) end," and the "good" which the "true" claims must be understood as cognitive. But cognitive "good" and moral "good" are brought into close connection, as species of teleological "good" and contributory to "the Good." Thus only the generic, not the specific, difference between them is abolished. The "true" becomes a sort of value, like the beautiful and the (moral) good. Moreover, since the "real" is the object of the "true," and can be distinguished from the "unreal" only by developing superior value in the process of cognition which arrives at it, the notions of "reality" and "fact" also turn out to be disguised forms of value. Thus the dualism between judgments of fact and judgments of value disappears : whatever "facts" we recognize are seen to be relative to the complex of human purposes to which they are re vealed. It should further be noted that pragmatism conceives "practice" very widely : it includes everything related to the con trol of experience. The dualism, therefore, between "practice" and "theory" also vanishes; a "theory" unrelated to practice (however, indirectly) is simply an illusion.