The King is head of the naval and military forces of the country and can alone recruit them. It is a statu tory offence for any other person to "recruit." The Bill of Rights has limited the exercise of this prerogative by making the raising and maintaining of a standing army in time of peace illegal. The words italicized are important ; they do not prohibit the exercise of the power in time of war and they leave the preroga tive unaffected as regards the navy. "The Crown is not precluded from raising a standing navy in time of peace nor from imposing a permanent discipline" and in time of war the King can impress sailors and ships by virtue of royal prerogative, R. v. Broadfoot (Foster, Crown Cases p. 154). There is considerable authority for the proposition that in time of war the King can conscript civilians for the defence of the realm although he cannot compel them to serve abroad. So, too, with certain limitations, he can requisition the subject's property and enter on the subject's land in time of war although this prerogative is now entirely regulated by statute (see the De Keyser Case below). The necessity of an annual statute to put in force the code of discipline known as the Army Act has, as it has been well said, made of the army "a statutory not a prerogative force." The fact also that all Army expenditure is subject to the annual vote of the Army Estimates has the same effect. And it is, in fact, impossible for the King to "make war," as distinct from declaring it, without the consent of Parliament. Not only would a vote of special supplies be necessary but by the Reserve Forces Act of 1882, mobilization itself is subject to Parliamentary consent inasmuch as the Army Reserve cannot be called up for permanent service unless Parlia ment is summoned within io days. The same condition is attached to the embodiment of the Territorial Force. (See also MARTIAL LAW and MILITARY LAW.) (3) Legislation.—The requirement of the King's assent to a bill passed by both Houses of Parliament before it can be "en acted" may be regarded as an aspect of the royal prerogative in that the King may, in law, withhold his assent. This prerogative is not dead—"time never runs against the King" so as to make a prerogative wholly obsolete by desuetude—but it has not been exercised since the reign of Queen Anne. But the King may legislate by prerogative, i.e., by Proclamation or by Order in Council, as distinct from statute. But it was long ago laid down by Coke that the King cannot, by his prerogative, alter the com mon law or create a new offence. In the case of colonies acquired by conquest or cession the prerogative is, however, as absolute as in the time of the earlier statutes. In such cases the King may make wnat laws he pleases (Campbell v. Hall, 20 St. Tr.
in the case of all colonies, even the self-governing Dominions, the King can "disallow" an Act to which his local representative, the Governor or Governor-General, has assented.
This power is recognized in the constitution of the self-governing Dominions themselves, but it is therein made subject to a period of limitation, usually one or two years.
It is the sole prerogative of the King to summon, prorogue and dissolve Parliament. This may properly be regarded as an executive, not a legislative, act and it is, of course, performed on the advice of ministers. As has been said above, it may be regarded as an accepted convention, at any rate since 1924, that the King cannot, under any circumstances, refuse to dissolve Parliament when a request to that effect is preferred by a Prime Minister. But he might still dissolve Parlia
ment ex proprio motu and against the wishes of his Prime Minister under certain circumstances, as, for example, when a Prime Minister having been defeated on a direct Vote of Confidence in the Commons refused either to resign or to ask for a dissolution. Such a state of affairs is not likely nor would it, in any case, be . durable, but it is not inconceivable.
The theory of the law is that the Govern ment of the country is still entirely a matter of prerogative, although, of course, many, if not most, of the powers now exer cised by the Crown have been conferred upon it by statute—in particular the power of making Statutory Rules and Orders (q.v.) to carry a statute into effect. All ministers are appointed by the King—on the nomination of the Prime Minister—and "Kiss hands" or, as in the case of Secretaries of State, receive their seals from the King himself. In law there is no such office as that of "Prime Minister." In the choice of a Prime Minister the King has, both in law and in fact, a discretion and he sends for whom he will, when the outgoing Prime Minister has resigned, but his choice is usually limited to the leader of the Opposition. All military and naval officers are appointed by a "commission" from the King. So too with the Governors of the Colonies. And as he appoints, so he dismisses. Every office under the Crown, except that of the judges and the Comptroller and Auditor General, is held "during pleasure." This doctrine has important legal conse quences in that the King's ministers, exercising the prerogative, can terminate any commission or contract of service whenever they please and the servant of the Crown, civil or military, has no remedy. English law "imports into every agreement" for service with the Crown the term "that the Crown has power to dismiss at pleasure" and even that any term of agreement pur porting to exclude this power would be void (Lord Watson in De Dohse v. the King quoted in Dunn v. the Queen [1896] Q.B. at p. '18). This is a striking example of how the preroga tive may operate to invest ministers with arbitrary power. No servant of the Crown has any legally enforceable right to pay, pension or security of tenure.
(6) General.—The less important prerogatives of the Crown may be dealt with generally. The King is the supreme landowner, a relic of feudal doctrines, which is only important in the case of a man dying intestate and without heirs in which case his land "escheats" to the Crown. The King also is the depositary of the prerogative of mercy, in other words he can pardon those who offend against his "peace"; the prerogative is now exercised ex clusively on the advice of the Home Secretary. He is the "fountain of honour" and as such is the sole grantor of titles such as peerages, baronetcies and knighthoods; his power in this respect is subject to no limitations except those contained in peerage law but "honours" are rarely conferred by him except on the advice of Ministers. He is the "supreme governor" of the Church in virtue of the Acts of Supremacy and Uniformity. The preroga tives of the Crown in the courts are dealt with in the article on PETITION OF RIGHT.