Effect of Statutes on the Prerogative.—As has been seen Parliament has frequently intervened to abolish some particular prerogative, deemed to be oppressive, and since the Revolution of 1689 it has never been doubted that such a statute will bind not only the King who actually assented to it but all his suc cessors. It has, however, until recently, been a matter of con siderable doubt and speculation whether a statute can curtail a prerogative in the absence of express words to that effect. In a book of considerable authority in its day, Chitty (The Preroga tive of the Crown [182o] p. 383) laid down that "Acts of Parlia ment which would divest or abridge the King of his prerogative, his interests or his remedies in the slightest degree do not in general extend to bind the King unless there be express words to that effect." This view was expressed more widely by a judge, Hobart, C. J., in 1624 in the quaint words "Everything [in a statute] for the benefit of the King shall be taken largely [i.e., liberally], as everything against the King shall be taken strictly" —Sir Edward Coke's Case (1624), Godbee's Reports, p. 289. Thus it has been successfully contended that the Crown is not bound by the Statute of Limitations and it has obtained judgment in proceedings against a subject, by Information of Debt, on a claim thirty years old (Brummell v. M'Pherson 7 L. J. [0.W. Series] Ch. But the presumption in favour of the Crown, in the interpretation of a statute, is no longer as strong as it was. In this respect the great case of Attorney-General v. De Keyser's Hotel [1920] A.C. is decisive to the extent that when Parlia ment has by statute regulated "the whole field of the prerogative," that particular prerogative can be exercised in no other way than that prescribed by the statute. In that case the Defence Act of
1842 had laid down regulations for the payment of compensation by the Crown for lands taken for the purpose of national defence, and it was held that, though that Act had not expressly abolished the prerogative of taking land or premises in time of war, the prerogative itself could only be exercised in accordance with the terms laid down by the Act, namely the payment of compensa tion duly assessed by a jury. The Crown's contention that, as there was no direct mention of the prerogative in the Act of 1842, that prerogative was unaffected and unimpaired, was decisively rejected by the courts. The same principle has been followed by the courts in the more recent case of Food Controller v. Cork (1923) A.C. 647. (See also articles on ATTORNEY-GENERAL, COM MON LAW, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PETITION OF RIGHT.) BIBLIOGRAPHY.—See W. Stanford, Exposition of the King's Preroga tives (1567) ; J. Comyns, Digest of the Laws of England (5 vols., 1762-67, 5th ed. 8 vols., 1822) ; J. Chitty, A Treatise of the Law of the Prerogatives of the Crown (1820) ; F. W. Maitland, Collected Papers vol. iii. (3 vols., 1911) ; J. H. Morgan, "Remedies against the Crown" in G. E. Robinson, Public Authorities and Legal Liability (1925) ; also A. V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Con stitution (8th ed. 1915) ; W. R. Anson, The Law and Custom of the Constitution (5th ed. M. L. Gwyer, 1922). (J. H. Mo.)