On April 4 the great battle to all intents and purposes came to an end. The initial success had been great; since March 21 from a base of 74 m. a penetration of no less than 38 m. had been effected; the ground lost in 1916 and abandoned in 1917 had been more than made good, and vast quantities of stores as well as 90,00o prisoners and 1,200 guns had been captured. The British Armies had been seriously defeated, and 20 French divi sions had been drawn into the battle; yet, in spite of the fact that 90 German divisions had been engaged, neither the transition to a war of movement nor the separation of the British and French forces had been achieved.
up an elaborate and complex system, largely dependent on the telephone, and when the static suddenly became fluid they paid the inevitable penalty of violating those fundamental axioms of war—simplicity and flexibility.
On the German side, Arras was the actual rock on which their plan broke, and by which their advance was diverted into less profitable channels. It is possible that military conservatism cost them dear. For Colonel Bruchmiiller, the famous artillery battle piece "producer," brought from the eastern front for this offensive, has revealed that while Hutier's army carried out his surprise bombardment designs, Below's in the north clung to their old fashioned methods, refusing to dispense with preliminary ranging. But if Hutier scored at the outset, his onrush slackened as his supplies and reinforcements failed with the distance covered, and when due tribute has been paid to the sturdy resistance, the Ger man advance is seen really to have beaten itself.