YPRES, BATTLES OF, 1917.) In the German counter-attack of Nov. 3o Ludendorff had used a key similar in principle if different in design—a short, sharp bombardment with gas and smoke shell, followed up by an inrush of infantry, specially trained in the new infiltration tactics. It would seem that by the following March the British had not sufficiently taken this lesson to heart. For, just as were the V. Army's subsequent excuses of weak numbers and a long line, the command had expressed ample confidence beforehand in its power to resist the onslaught. As a result, when the original front was forced, an inadequate preparation and co-ordination of the measures to block the enemy's path further back was re vealed. The Army Command had failed to arrange for the blow ing up of certain causeways and G.H.Q. had not given it a definite order. Worse still was the confusion caused by the fact that in the case of the more important railway bridges, this duty was entrusted to the railway authorities instead of the local com manders, and in this way the vital railway bridge at Peronne was allowed to fall undestroyed into German hands.
If this was good luck for the Germans, their thorough and skilful preparations for the initial assault had earned them suc• cess—although here again fortune favoured them. Ludendorff's solution for breaking the deadlock was a compound of wider frontages of attack, new infantry tactics, and, above all, for surprise, a lavish use of gas in a brief but intense artillery bom bardment. For it, masses of artillery were brought up close to the front line in concealment, and against the V. Army front opened fire without preliminary ranging. This was to be followed by the infiltration of many dispersed little groups of automatic rifles and machine-guns. But the effect of the gas-gained sun prise was immensely increased by nature, which in the early hours of March 21 provided a thick mist, which cloaked the infiltrating assailants as much as it masked the defending machine-guns. Without this aid it is questionable how far the German tactical surprise would have succeeded, and in this lay the essential in feriority of the German method of surprise, which still depended on unarmoured infantry, compared with the British surprise at Cambrai, and later, on Aug. 8, 1918, which was achieved by armoured machines.
general move forward was made under the cover of a creeping barrage, supplemented by low-flying aircraft. The British out post zone was overrun almost everywhere by midday, but this was inevitable, and had been foreseen. But the northern attack met such stubborn resistance against the right of Byng's III. Army that it had not seriously penetrated the main battle zone even by the night of the 22nd, and, despite putting in successive reinforcements, the capture of Vaulx-Vraucourt was then the high-water mark of its progress. On most parts of Gough's V. Army front the battle-zone resistance was just as firm, but the flood found a way through on the 21st near La Fere, on the extreme right, at Essigny and Ronssoy. The resistance of the 21st Division at Epehy for a time checked this last breach from spreading northward, but it began to crumble so deeply that the neighbouring sectors were affected. Southward, near St. Quentin, the line sagged still more deeply, and on the night of the 22nd Gough felt compelled to order a general retirement to the line of the Somme.
On the 23rd Ludendorff gave the XVIII. Army, his left or southern wing, a limited permission to exploit this opportunity along the line of least resistance. But for several days he still pinned his faith and reserve strength to his right wing, despite the relatively small progress of his XVII. Army in the north and by the enforced postponement of its intended supplementary at tack towards Arras, where Byng had anticipated the blow by a partial withdrawal. When the postponed blow was attempted on the 28th it collapsed under a storm of fire from the expectant defence. No fog came to the German aid. At last Ludendorff threw his weight into the push along the Somme westward, although he still held his left wing in a tight rein. But by that time the new surge towards Amiens was almost as stagnant, its impetus slackening far less because of the resistance than because of the exhaustion of the German troops and the difficulty of sup ply in so rapid and deep an advance. This was accentuated because their route had taken them across the desert formed by the old battlefields of 1916. On March 3o and April 4 they made fresh attempts, but the effect was and could only be local. For the resistance in the south had been given time, and relief from pressure, to harden into a crust which the belated intervention of fresh German reserves could not break.