Representation

The establishment of mere party majority rule, which is char acteristic of a representative system, is a necessity, no doubt, in popular government but the way in which a substantial minority of voters may only obtain a contemptible minority of members, and may in practice be tyrannized over in consequence, somewhat detracts from its blessings, and leads to extreme party measures.

The division of the whole electoral body into constituencies is, after all, only a device for getting over the difficulty of the electors voting en bloc, and it does not seem to justify the conversion of a real majority in the country into a minority as represented in parliament, nor the complete exclusion of a substantial number of the electorate from parliamentary representation—so far as their views are concerned--at all. Yet under the English system such results are possible as the capture of every seat in Wales (34), in 1906, by the Liberal party, with 217,462 votes, the Unionist voters having no representation in parliament.

Proportional Representation.

The attempt to rectify this flaw in the representative method has led to the suggestion of various devices by the adoption of which the elected members may correspond more equally to the divisions of opinion in the electorate. Under the plan of scrutin de liste (or "general ticket") larger districts are created, each returning several members, and each voter has as many votes as there are members to elect ; but while this system apparently provides the opportunity for the return of candidates with different views, it only requires a solid party vote to capture the whole of the representation for a ma jority. What is known as the "limited vote" is a form of scrutin de liste by which the elector has less votes than there are seats to be filled; with (say) three to be elected, the elector has only two votes. Systems of "limited vote" are in force in Portugal, Spain and Japan. A somewhat better plan is the "cumulative vote," which gives each elector as many votes as there are mem bers to be elected, but allows him to divide them as he pleases (instead of giving only one vote to any one candidate). This enables an organized minority, by concentrating their votes, to elect at all events some representative ; but the "cumulative vote" works rather capriciously, and is commonly defeated by careful party organization.

A more elaborate plan, but depending like the "limited" vote and the "cumulative" vote on the formation of constituencies returning three or more members each, is that of the "transferable vote." By this device an elector can indicate on his ballot paper

not only his first choice, but also his second or third, etc. To en sure election a candidate need not obtain a majority of the votes polled, but only a certain number, so fixed that it can be obtained by a number of candidates equal to the number of seats to be filled, but by no more ; this number of votes is called the "quota." At the first count first choices only are reckoned, and those candidates who have received a "quota" or more are declared duly elected. If all the seats have not then been filled up, the sur plus votes of those candidates who have received more than the "quota" are transferred according to the names marked (2) on them. If these transfers still do not bring the requisite number of candidates up to the "quota," the lowest candidate is eliminated and his votes transferred according to the next preferences, and so on till the seats are filled. This system, which is the one usually associated with the term "proportional representation" was first suggested by Thomas Hare, who published in 1857 a pamphlet on The Machinery of Representation, and in 1859 a more complete scheme in his treatise on The Election of Representatives. John Stuart Mill, in Representative Government 0860 warmly en dorsed Hare's proposal. Hare wished to treat the whole country as one constituency, but by later supporters of the "transferable vote" that plan was abandoned as impracticable; and the principle will work so long as the constituencies adopted each return several members. Lord Courtney, in his evidence before the British Royal Commission in 1909, said that his minimum constituency would be a three-membered one, but he would create a 15-mem bered constituency without hesitation. The simple "transferable vote" has been adopted in Tasmania for all elections (1907), after experimental adoption in the constituencies of Hobart and Launceston in 1896-1901, and in the election of the Tasmanian members of the Commonwealth legislature in 1900. It was pro posed in the draft of the South African constitution, but aban doned. The principle was also adopted in the "list systems" of Belgium, some Swiss cantons, Sweden, Finland and parts of Den mark, 'Wurttemberg and Serbia, where candidates are grouped in lists and all votes given to individual candidates on the list count first as votes for the list itself, the seats being divided among the lists in proportion to the total number of votes obtained by the list.