The principle of proportional representation has been widely adopted in the many new constitutions that have been established in Europe as the result of revolution or secession following on the World War. The most notable is that established in Germany by the Electoral Law of April 27, 1920, for the Reichstag, whereby every party receives a degree of representation corresponding to the number of votes cast in the whole of Germany, one deputy being returned for every 6o,000 party votes cast. Minority votes in one constituency are added to the minority votes of the same party complexion cast in another. Article 17 of the Reich con stitution further imposes the system of proportional representa tion (V erheiltniswahl) on the elections to the State legislatures, though the form it has taken differs in the different States. The principle was also adopted by s. 15 of the Government of Ireland Act 1920 and is in consequence in force in Northern Ireland. By Article 26 of the Irish Free State Constitution it has been adopted by the Irish Free State. The extension of the principle in Europe in recent years has been extraordinary. Switzerland adopted it for Federal elections by a referendum to that effect which resulted in its adoption in 1918 in the Constitution. The post-war constitu tions of Poland (Art. II), Czechoslovakia (Art. 13), Austria (Art. 26), make similar provision.
The use of the general term "proportional representation" is, however, somewhat misleading ; people often suppose that only one identical system of voting is meant, whereas in fact some 30o possible varieties have been proposed, and each of the States mentioned has a different one from all the others. The only corn mon element is the device of the "transferable vote," i.e., the method of having an "electoral quota," and the filling up of seats, where a quota is not provided by the first choices, by votes trans ferred from the second choices, and so on. It may be noted here that the "transferable vote" is calculated to multiply candidates to a point at which the minds of the electorate may well be em barrassed as to their preferences (the largest Belgian constituency returns 22 members), and, while undoubtedly providing for "mi nority representation," to encourage what may be called "minority thinking" and particularist politics. The "transferable vote" is commonly objected to as puzzling to the electors and too com plicated for the scrutineers, while it is not much favoured by "machine" party organizations, which generally prefer the simpler plan of rough-and-ready majorities; but it has received a growing amount of theoretical support, as well as success in practical experiment, in recent years.
candidate who heads the poll may well have only a relative, not an absolute, majority of votes, and to meet this objection the "second ballot" has been introduced in several European countries. Under this system, if no candidate receives an absolute majority of all the votes, a second election is held, at which, as a rule, only the two candidates compete who received most ; or in cases where more than one seat is to be filled, twice as many candidates com pete as there are seats. In principle the second ballot has much in its favour, though it does not necessarily reflect the real opinion of the electorate, but only what is practicable ; and while leading to political bargaining it does nothing for minority representation.
In England the importance of the whole subject of the method of elections was recognized at the end of 1908 by the appointment of a Royal Commission to enquire and report. Its conclusions were published in 1910, after much interesting evidence had been taken, but they attracted little attention, being in the main adverse to innovation.
It may be said broadly that all the devices which have been proposed for mitigating or redressing the defects of electoral methods ignore the essential fact that in any case a representative system can only result in a rather arbitrary approximation to cor respondence with the opinions of the electorate. It is by no means certain even that "proportional representation" in any of its forms would always result in the return of a representative assembly reflecting with mathematical accuracy the balance of opinion in the electorate ; and even if it did, the electors have a way of changing their opinions long before their representatives come up for re-election. It was stated before the British Royal Commission that in Belgium, in spite of "proportional repre sentation," both in 1900 and in 1902 a majority of members was returned by a minority of votes. While under majority rule, as Augustine Birrell once remarked, "minorities must suffer"— even large minorities—it is on the other hand not likely to conduce to the popularity of representative government that minorities should obtain too great a share of political power. Moreover its adoption sometimes, as in Germany, simply results in such a multi plicity of parties, sects and factions as to make a stable Govern ment almost impossible. The fact is that no "representation" can reflect the views of those "represented" as accurately as "presen tation" by those entitled personally to speak. This conclusion, while in no necessary degree qualifying the importance of "popu lar government," undoubtedly detracts from the value of the representative method. The result is seen in the increasing desire in really democratic countries to supplement representative gov ernment by some form of Referendum, or direct appeal to the electors for their own personal opinion on a distinct issue—a, method which involves fundamentally the addition of a "presenta tive" element to the representative system.