Disposition of Troops.—The Polish situation was now critical. With the help of the French military mission, under Gen. Wey gand, a plan for a great counter-attack was evolved on Aug. 6. The situation of the opposing sides on that date was as follows:— Soviet: (1) Northern group. Four armies-4th, 15th, 3rd and i6th, with a cavalry corps on the extreme north aiming to out flank the Polish left.
(2) Southern group. Two armies-12th and 14th with Bu denny's cavalry, along a line from Kowel through Brody to Tarnupol. The men of the Soviet army were unfed and worn out with a month's marching.
Poles: (I) A Northern group formed of units which had been retreating for over a month, strengthened by reinforcements thrown in hastily as they came up. Much material had been lost and the men were tired and hungry, but the approach to the line of the Vistula was beginning to simplify the supply of food and munitions.
(2) Southern group. Three armies-6th, 3rd and 4th—facing the Soviet southern group. Here pressure from the enemy had been by no means so severe as in the north and many of the divisions still retained their original fighting value.
Polish Plan of Attack.—The Polish plan was to withdraw all but a minimum of force from the southern area and to attack the Soviet northern group with the greatest possible strength. The operation bears a close resemblance to Ludendorff's ma noeuvre at Tannenberg. In many respects the situation was similar. The Russians were advancing in two main groups di vided by the Pripet marshes instead of the Masurian lakes. Here the Soviet southern group was advancing slowly like Rennen kampf's army in 1914. The situation would become critical as soon as the two Soviet groups converged upon the Polish Army. No time was to be lost. Would the commander of the Soviet armies in the south allow himself to be deceived in the same man ner as Rennenkampf ? On August 6 orders for the following fresh groupings were issued from Polish headquarters:— (i) Three armies-2nd, 1st and 5th—under Gen. Joseph Hal ler, were to withdraw slowly to the line of the Vistula from Deb lin to Modlin, with the 5th Army pushed well forward on the left to prevent any outflanking of the Polish left between Warsaw and the East Prussian frontier.
(2) Two armies, 3rd and 4th—were to concentrate behind the Wieprz between Chelm and Deblin, ready to strike due north; the advance of these two armies to commence on Aug. 16.
(3) One army, 6th—would withdraw as necessity arose in the direction of Lemberg, tempting the Soviet southern group away from the critical point in the north.
By Aug. 12 all the armies, with the exception of the two on each flank, had reached their assigned positions without incident. In the south the 3rd had found the 12th Soviet army advancing and had been forced to throw out a detachment on its right flank to cover its concentration. It had been delayed in consequence. In the north, the 5th had been driven back by overwhelming strength and had been unable to prevent the enemy outflanking movement.
Enthusiasm in the Polish army had risen surprisingly in the days since the momentous decision to attack had been taken. The chief of the Polish State, Marshal Pilsudski, had himself taken command of the 3rd and 4th Armies. With the help of Weygand and his staff the service of supply had been restored. New bodies of reinforcements were moved forward from the depots in Western Poland and the depleted units began to raise their heads again. National optimism returned. The enemy in the south made no determined move and appeared to have no inkling of what was afoot. Every hour that he delayed meant more chance of success for the Polish plan.
Polish Advance.—Gen. Sikorski's 5th Army in the north was the first to move. The Soviet movement round his left had as sumed alarming proportions and had to be stopped. On Aug. 14 he pressed forward from his defensive position at Modlin and at once encountered the Soviet i sth Army advancing to the attack. Sikorski persisted in his attacks all through Aug. 15 and 16, his men fighting with determination. Not even the appear ance of elements of the Soviet 4th Army in his left rear turned him from his purpose. Throwing out covering detachments to watch his rear, he attacked again on Aug. 17. His determination reaped its reward, for the enemy gave way in front of him, their retreat rapidly developing into a rout.