RUSSO-POLISH CAMPAIGN. This campaign, of 192o, which resulted in the defeat and rout of the Soviet Army when it was within sight of the Polish capital, is full of dramatic incident. Organization of command, staff and administration was lacking on both sides, but above all it was the want of a proper system of supply which accounted for the sudden collapse of troops en gaged in a victorious advance. The thinly populated territory lying between the Niemen in the north and the Dniester in the south was incapable of supporting large bodies of troops, and as both sides attempted to live on the country during their advances the failure of their operations followed quickly each success.
Cause of the War.—During the course of 1919 and early 192o, the Soviet Government had succeeded in clearing their territory of the White Russian armies under Kolchak, Denikin and Yuden ich. They were thus at liberty to examine the situation on their frontiers. With such a mixture of races living side by side in the disputed regions no delimitation of frontier would have suited all parties, and in the absence of authority to enforce a decision, trouble quickly arose between the Soviet and the newly formed Polish State. Poland was determined to maintain her new liberty and had called up fresh levies to support the various legions which had been repatriated from the fronts upon which they had been fighting in the World War. The Soviet began to concentrate their troops towards the west. Inflammatory speeches in Moscow and a fierce propaganda amongst the Polish working people brought Polish public opinion to a fever heat. From seven divisions in January the Soviet had, by March, increased the number of their troops facing the Poles to 20 divisions, with three cavalry divi sions. Poland decided that she could not wait quietly for the inevitable Soviet attack by which she would certainly be destroyed, and that she must act at once.
Polish Offensive.—Strategically, the territory in dispute may be divided into two separate areas : White Russia in the north and Volhynia and Podolia in the south. The marshes of the Pri pet divide one area from the other. Acting in collusion with Pet
lura, the Hetman of the Ukraine, who had promised to raise his country against the Soviet, the Poles advanced in April as far as Kiev. By the beginning of May the Polish-Soviet front ran from Dvinsk in the north along the course of the Dnieper to Kiev and thence to the Dniester near Kamenets. No sooner were the Poles established in Kiev than the Soviet northern army began to ad vance. The Poles were able to transfer troops from the south and counter-attacked the Soviet forces which had already penetrated as far west as Lida and Baranoicze. By the end of May the line held at the beginning of the month had been restored. Operations had been most ably carried out by the Polish minister of war, Gen. Sosnkowski, but there were indications that the Soviet were transferring more and more troops to the west and that a renewal of their attacks might be expected.
At the beginning of June, in the southern area there appeared a new Soviet cavalry leader, Budenny, who completely altered the situation. Budenny had been a non-commissioned officer in the old Russian Army and soon proved himself a man of action. Within a month he had driven back the Poles a distance of zoom. until their line in the south ran just east of Pinsk and Rowne (Rovno) to the junction of the Dniester and Siret (Sereth).
Russian Success.—Fighting in the northern area continued intermittently during the month of June, preventing the Poles from transferring troops to the hard-pressed south. Despite the operations in the south it was clear that the main Soviet attack was coming in the north. On July 4 the blow fell. The whole Polish line gave way. Wilno (Vilna) and Minsk were lost in the first week. Grodno fell on July 20 and Bialystok on July 25. By the end of July the Soviet advance guards had reached the Bug. In 25 days the Poles had lost 3oom. of territory. The main cause of the collapse was their failure to constitute reserves. In their desire to protect their new territory they had been led into a linear defence on a front of nearly 800m., where they were strong nowhere.