Whether any of the Dharmaiastras were ever used in India as actual "codes of law" for the practical administration of justice is doubtful. No doubt these works were held to be of the highest authority as laying down the principles of religious and civil duty ; but it was not so much any single text as the whole body of the Smriti that was looked upon as the embodiment of the divine law. Hence, the moment the actual work of codification begins in the th century, we find the jurists engaged in practically showing how the Smritis confirm and supplement each other, and in recon ciling seeming contradictions between them. This new phase of Indian jurisprudence begins with Vijfianeivara's Mitakshard, which, although primarily a commentary on Yajfiavalkya, is so rich in original matter and illustrations from other Smritis that it is far more adapted to serve as a code of law than the work it professes to explain. This treatise is held in high esteem all over India, with the exception of the Bengal or Gauriya school of law, which recognizes as its chief authority the digest of its founder, Jimutavahana, especially the chapter on succession, entitled Dayabluiga. Based on the Mitakshara are the Smritichandrikd, a work of great common sense, written by Devancla Bhaqa, in the r3th century, and highly esteemed in Southern India; and the Viramitrodaya, a compilation consisting of two chapters, on achara and vyavahara, made in the first half of the i 7th century by MitramiSra, for Raja Virasirnha, or Birsinh Deo of Orchha, who murdered Abul Fazl, the minister of the emperor Akbar, and author of the Ain-i Akbari. There is no need here to enumerate any more of the vast number of treatises on special points of law, the more important of which will be found mentioned in English digests of Hindu law.
The fundamental conception of this doctrine finds its expression in the two synonymous terms brahman (neutr.), probably origin ally "mystic effusion, devotional utterance," then "holy impulse," and atman (masc.), "breath, self, soul." The recognition of the essential sameness of the individual souls, emanating all alike (whether really or imaginarily) from the ultimate spiritual essence (parama-brahman) "as sparks issue from the fire," and destined to return thither, involved some im portant problems. Considering the infinite diversity of individ ual souls of the animal and vegetable world, exhibiting various degrees of perfection, is it conceivable that each of them is the immediate efflux of the Supreme Being, the All-perfect, and that each, from the lowest to the highest, could re-unite therewith directly at the close of its mundane existence? The difficulty im plied in the latter question was at first met by the assumption of an intermediate state of expiation and purification, a kind of pur gatory; but the whole problem found at last a more comprehensive solution in the doctrine of transmigration (sonsara). This doc trine not found in the Rigveda was probably aboriginal and adopted by the Aryan invaders. The notion of samsara has be come an axiom, a universally conceded principle of Indian philo sophy. Thus the latter has never quite risen to the heights of pure thought; its object is indeed jijiiasa, the search for saving knowl edge; but it is an inquiry (mimcimsd) into the nature of things undertaken not solely for the attainment of the truth, but with a view to a specific object—the discontinuance of samsdra, the ces sation of mundane existence after the present life. The task of the philosopher is to discover the means of attaining moksha, "re lease" from the bondage of material existence, and union with the Supreme Self—in fact, salvation. Desire is due to ignorance or wrong knowledge of true nature of things and is the cause of transmigration. The purpose of each philosophical school is to attain true and saving knowledge. Intense self-contemplation be ing the only way of attaining the all-important knowledge, this doctrine left little or no room for those mediatorial offices of the priest, so indispensable in ceremonial worship ; and indeed we actually read of Brahman sages resorting to Kshatriya princes to hear them expound the true doctrine of salvation. But, in spite of their anti-hierarchical tendency, these speculations continued to gain ground; and in the end the body of treatises propounding the pantheistic doctrine, the Upanishads, were admitted into the sacred canon, as appendages to the ceremonial writings, the Brahmanas. The Upanishads thus form literally "the end of the Veda," the Vedanta; but their adherents claim this title for their doctrines in a metaphorical rather than in a material sense, as "the ultimate aim and consummation of the Veda." In later times the radical distinction between these speculative appendages and the bulk of the Vedic writings was strongly accen tuated in a new classification of the sacred scriptures. According to this scheme they were supposed to consist of two great divisions —the Karma-kaqa, "the work-section," or practical ceremonial (exoteric) part, consisting of the Sarnhitas and Brahmanas (in cluding the ritual portions of the Aranyakas), and the "the knowledge-section," or speculative (esoteric) part. These two divisions are also called respectively the Pfirva- ("former") and Uttara- ("latter," or higher) kancla; and when the speculative tenets of the Upanishads came to be formulated into a regular system it was deemed desirable that there should also be a special system corresponding to the older and larger portion of the Vedic writings. Thus arose the two systems—the Pitrva- (or Karma-) mimamsa, or "prior (practical) speculation," and the Uttara- (or Brahma-) mimamsd, or higher inquiry (into the nature of the godhead), usually called the Vedanta philosophy.