St Mihiel

ST. MIHIEL, a town of north-eastern France, in the depart ment of Meuse, on the right bank of the Meuse and the Canal de l'Est, 23 M. S. by E. of Verdun by rail. Pop. (1931) 4,417. St. Mihiel is famous for its Benedictine abbey of St. Michael, founded in 709. The abbey buildings (occupied by the municipal offices) date from the end of the 17th century and the beginning of the 18th century, and the church from the 17th century. The church of St. Etienne, chiefly in the flamboyant Gothic style, contains a magnificent Holy Sepulchre by Ligier Richier. St. Mihiel formerly possessed fortifications and two castles, destroyed in 1635.

Battle of St. Mihiel, 1918.

In his first conference with the commander-in-chief of the French armies, Gen. Pershing visualized the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient as the first American operation in the World War. In accordance with studies made at his headquarters in Sept. 1917, he planned that the de cisive American effort would be against the German railroad sys tem north and east of the Meuse river and the ore deposits in the vicinity of Metz and Longwy, with the elimination of the St. Mihiel salient as a necessary preliminary. Though early Ameri can control of the Woevre sector was agreed (May 19, 1918) the demands for American troops to assist the Allies in meeting the Germans elsewhere limited further steps along these lines to the creation of supply installations. At Bombon, on July 24, the com manders-in-chief, having determined to maintain the offensive, accepted Gen. Pershing's proposal that his army should undertake to reduce the St. Mihiel salient bef ore the autumn rains began about the middle of September. This operation harmonized with the Château Thierry offensive and the British and French attacks against the Amiens and Ypres-Lys salients, made in order to free strategic railroads, preparatory to more extended operations. The counter-offensives against the Marne and Amiens salients in July and Aug. had gained such advantages that it was apparent the emergency which justified the dispersion of American divi sions had passed. On Aug. 9, final decision was given for the im

mediate assembly of the American army for an attack against the St. Mihiel salient.

The American troops in France—at this time, over 1,200,000— were sufficient for the offensive, but they were dispersed along the front from Switzerland to the Channel. While the I. Army Headquarters, two corps and corps troops and seven divisions were operating in the Marne offensive, other American divisions were holding sectors in the Vosges and Lorraine and several were training as reserves behind the British front. To assemble these combat and service troops into an army and undertake a major operation within the short period available and with the staffs so recently organized was an extremely difficult task. Deficiencies in artillery, aviation and special troops, caused by shipment of an undue proportion of infantry and machine guns to assist the Allies, were largely met by the French. While the I. American army was given a distinct and independent mission, Gen. Pershing suggested, as expedient, that it should function under the nominal direction of Gen. Petain, the French commander-in-chief, in order to assure co-ordination on the part of the French armies adjacent to the I. army and to provide French units needed at the outset for supply services. To all intents and purposes the I. army was entirely in dependent of French command, as all plans were prepared and all movements and operations ordered by the commander of the I. army. The initial battle plan approved by Marshal Foch by Aug. 17, contemplated as an ultimate objective the general line: Marieulles (east of the Moselle), the heights south of Gorze, Mars la Tour, Etain and the employment of 25 divisions under Gen. Pershing's personal direction. In furtherance of this plan, the scattered divisions, corps and service troops were first gathered in areas about Chaumont and Neuf chateau and then, beginning Aug. 28, the army advanced to its battle position.