The I. American army took command of the front from Port Sur-Seille (east of the Moselle) to Watronville (north of Les Eparges) from the II. and VIII. French Armies on Aug. 3o. On this day, at I. American Army headquarters (Ligny en Barrios), Marshal Foch discussed with Gen. Pershing a general plan for future operations and proposed employing American divisions under French command in the Champagne and Meuse-Argonne regions with a material reduction of the St. Mihiel forces in order to make available American troops for these new operations. Gen. Pershing could not accept such plans as they would require the immediate separation of the recently formed I. American army into several groups delaying further the formation of a distinct American army. Moreover, an enormous amount of preparations had already been made in supplies and munitions and in construc tion of roads, railroads, regulating stations and other installations for the supply of the army on a particular front. While willing to accept the employment of the American army as a unit where de sired, Gen. Pershing would not entertain proposals for its dis ruption. At a later conference on Sept. 2, the employment of the American army as a unit was conceded and a decision reached to the effect that after reducing the St. Mihiel salient, the I. Ameri can army would attack by Sept. 25 between the Meuse river and Argonne forest (see MEUSE-ARGONNE BATTLE). As a result of these decisions, the depth of the St. Mihiel operation was limited to the line Vigneulles, Thiaucourt, Regnieville. The number of divi sions to be used was reduced and the time shortened. There were I5 American divisions (each equal in size to two French divisions) and 4 French divisions available, 6 of which would be in reserve. Furthermore, two Army Corps headquarters and corps troops, practically all army artillery and aviation, and the 1st, 2nd and 4th divisions, the first two destined for a leading part in the St. Mihiel attack, were all due to be withdrawn and started for the Meuse-Argonne by the fourth day of the battle.
The salient had been held by the Germans since Sept. It covered the most sensitive section of the enemy's position on the western front ; i.e., the Mezieres-Sedan-Metz railroad and the Briey Iron Basin ; it threatened the entire region between Verdun and Nancy, and interrupted the main railroad line from Paris to the east. Its primary strength lay in the natural defensive features of the terrain itself. The western face of the salient extended along the rugged, heavily wooded eastern heights of the Meuse; the southern face followed the heights of the Meuse for 8 kilo meters to the east and then crossed the plain of the Woevre, including within the German lines the detached heights of Loup mont and Mont Sec which dominated the plain and afforded the enemy unusual facilities for observation. The enemy had rein forced the positions by every artificial means during a period of four years. Having concentrated by night movements over 600,000 men on the battle-field, the troops of the I. Army were deployed in attack positions on the night of Sept. II. On the south face of the salient was the I. Corps (4 divisions in line) extending from the Moselle westward. On its left was the IV. Corps (3 divisions in line) with left facing Mont Sec. These two corps were to deliver the main attack, the advance pivoting on the centre of the I.
Corps. The left of the IV. Corps was to advance toward the heart of the salient where contact would be made with the V. Corps from the west. On the western face of the salient lay the V. Corps (3 divisions in line) extended from Mouilly via Les Eparges to Watronville. While the centre division made a deep advance to gain contact with the IV. Corps on the south, the rest of the corps was to limit its advance while covering the flanks of the centre division. Between the IV. and V. Corps around the apex of the salient, the II. French Corps (3 divisions in line) covering 4o km., had the mission of attacking to hold the enemy in the salient. American artillery and aviation were greatly augmented by French artillery and aviation and assisted indirectly by the British inde pendent air force located south of Nancy. The heavy artillery could reach the railroads entering Metz.
Gen. Foch's Army Detachment C held the salient on Sept. 12 with 8 divisions in line and 3 divisions in immediate reserve. While the Germans had an inkling of a possible American attack as early as Sept. 1, the magnitude and imminence were not suspected. An American ruse at Belfort, which comprised extensive preparation for an attack in that region, proved misleading to the enemy. A decision having been made to withdraw in face of a serious attack at St. Mihiel, preparations for a deliberate and methodical with drawal were under way, some dismounted batteries having been displaced, when the Americans launched their attack at dawn on Sept. 12.
After four hours' violent artillery preparation, accompanied by small tanks, the I. and IV. Corps advanced. The infantry of the V. Corps attacked at 8 A.M. The operation was carried out with entire precision. Just after daylight of the 13th, elements of the IV. and V. Corps joined at Vigneulles, 18 km. N.E. of St. Mihiel. The enemy was overwhelmed and all objectives were reached on the afternoon of Sept. 13. During the 14th and 15th, while the two German counter-attacks were repulsed by the I. Corps, the Americans advanced along the Moselle to the line Jaulny-Pagny sur Moselle. On Sept. 14-16, local operations continued, American patrols advancing to Dampvitoux, eastern edge of Etang de Lach aussee, Jonville and Fresnes-en-Woevre. The energy and swif t ness with which the operation was carried out enabled the Ameri cans to smother the opposition to such an extent that they suffered less than 7,500 casualties during the actual period of the advance. During the battle the Germans engaged four new divisions and drew into local reserve several other divisions.
The Americans captured nearly 16,000 prisoners (over 4,00o in the salient proper), 443 guns and large stores of material and supplies. The moral result of the victory was striking. An Ameri can army had suddenly appeared and crushed the enemy in one of his strongest positions. No form of propaganda could overcome the depressing effect on the enemy of this demonstration of ability to organize a large American force in so short a time and drive it successfully through its defences. The strength of the I. American Army in the battle totalled over 500,000 Americans and I oo,000 French, approximately 2,900 cannon, 400 tanks and i,000 aero planes. (H. A. DR. ; J. J. P.)