The Turks numbered 135,000 men north of the Balkans who were distributed in the following manner : 8o,000 in the quadri lateral, 23,000 around Vidin, Io,000 in Nicopol, 8,000 in Do brudja, 3,000 in Tirnovo, 4,000 in Sistovo, 2,000 at Lom Palanka and 5,000 at Rahoff. Forty thousand men were grouped around Adrianople and Constantinople and some 8o,000 in Bosnia, Mon tenegro and Epirus. The Turks besides disposed of another 120,000 men in Asia Minor.
Political and military reasons forced Turkey to remain on the defensive while Russia was bent on the swiftest possible offensive—bordering on rashness. Rumania having allowed the Russians to traverse her territory greatly aided their initial con centration towards the Danube. She was even prepared in the middle of June to join the Russians against the Turks with her force of 32,00o infantry and 5,000 cavalry, but the Russians, feeling certain of an easy victory, declined her proffered help. Two months later they were only too glad to avail themselves of this assistance which would have been of inestimable value in their first operations south of the Danube. To cross this river was their primary object, but this was impeded by the Turkish flotilla which patrolled the Danube and prevented them bridging it. The Russians by means of steam launches, batteries, mines and torpedoes drove the Turkish ironclads into Sulina harbour, one being destroyed, while the smaller vessels were obliged to seek refuge in Silistria and Ruschuk. Mines were laid across the Danube, bridging now being made possible. Hearing of the hostile approach, Abdul Kerim, the Turkish leader, decided not to make a resolute defence against the enemy crossing the Danube, but to attack him, when advancing to besiege Ruschuk and Shumla. The distribution of the Turkish troops remained little changed by the middle of June ; the detachments guarding the Danube were generally too weak to offer any serious resistance to the invader.
The Russians began crossing the river in boats at Zimniza early on June 23 and the following day the VIII. corps was across, standing on the southern bank of the Danube. The same day a bridge 1,300 yards long was begun to be constructed at Nicopol, which was ready by July 1, a second one being ready by Aug. i. The other Russian corps, the XII. and XIII., commanded by the Tsarevitch, having crossed the Danube moved to the Lom and Yantra facing Ruschuk with the object of laying siege to it while the IX. corps made for Nicopol. Gourko's advance guard entered Tirnova July 7, the VIII. corps following it five days later. The Grand Duke Nicholas wished to cross the Balkans with two corps while guarding his right flank with the IX. corps, and watch ing Ruschuk fortress with the XII. and XIII. corps, but Alex ander II. would not sanction this, rightly considering this plan too risky. Gourko left Tirnova July 12 hearing the Shipka Pass was defended by only 3,00o men. He made for the Hainkioi Pass intending to turn the Shipka Pass (q.v.), while a Russian detach
ment attacked the Pass from the north. Gourko having been de layed 24 hours, was repulsed by the Turks when attacking the Pass; the same fate befell the Russians advancing north of Shipka. Nevertheless next day Gourko again pressed forward, when the Turks offered to negotiate terms of capitulation. While they were being drawn up the Turks evacuated all their positions and re treated to Philipopolis. Gourko's capture of Shipka gave the advantage to the Russians for a short time only, though he hast ened to put it in a state of defence and it remained in their hands up to the end of the war. Alarmed by the incursion of the Rus sians, the Turks recalled Suleiman Pasha from Montenegro with his army 30,00o strong and having transported it by sea to the mouth of Maritza pushed it forward without delay on July 23 be tween Hermanli and Karabunar. After several engagements against greatly superior forces Gourko received orders Aug. 5 from the Headquarters to return north of the Balkans. The passes being deemed of great importance the Russians decided to defend them with the 9th Division, 4th Rifle Brigade and a Bulgarian contingent.
Meanwhile Nicopol fell July 17, the IX corps capturing 8,000 men and 'it now received orders to advance to Plevna. General Krudener, its commander, detached one division under Schilder Schuldner, which without any preliminary reconnaissance at tacked the Turks July 20, only to be thrown back with heavy losses by Osman Pasha's much superior force, which had marched from Vidin unperceived by the Russians. Though the Rumanians had warned them of the hostile approach no serious attention was given by the Russian military authorities, for which they had to pay dearly. But even now the Russians thought this to be a momentary check and gave orders to make a fresh effort to cap ture Plevna, for which purpose they detailed 40,000 men. Osman Pasha had meanwhile entrenched himself round Plevna and had occupied Lovcha on the 26th, thereby securing the direct road to Sofia. The second attempt to capture the town, July 31, failed as the first and the Russians at last began to realize that their forces were inadequate to vanquish the enemy. The Tsar, by an Imperial Ukaze called up the Guard and Grenadier Corps, 24th and 26th Infantry Divisions, also the 2nd and 3rd Infantry Divisions with the 3rd Rifle Brigade which had already left Moscow for Bulgaria. Valuable assistance was also forthcoming from the Rumanian forces, which now joined the Russians. The Russian plan of campaign, which was faulty to a degree, now became absolutely impossible, there being no longer any question of moving south of the Balkans, whilst Osman from Plevna might threaten not only their right flank, but the bridges across the Danube. Every effort was to be made to vanquish the Turkish force defending Plevna, now greatly strengthened by field works.