SOMME, BATTLES OF THE, 1916. This series of battles, or, more strictly, succession of limited engagements, con stituted the offensive campaign of the Franco-British armies in 1916. Into it was thrown the entire British effort of the year on the Western Front and such part of the French effort as was available after the exhausting strain of the long defensive "battle" at Verdun (q.v.). The genesis of the Somme offensive is dealt with under WORLD WAR.
The original intention had been that the French should play the larger part in the attack, but as they were drained of their strength at Verdun (q.v.) so did their share of the Somme plan evaporate. Eventually their front of attack on the Somme shrank from 25 miles to eight and their force from an intended 4o divi sions to 16, of which only five assaulted on July 1. From now onward the British were to take up the major burden of the Western Front campaign, and this alone invests the attack of July I, 1916 with a special significance. Yet the aims of the British commander-in-chief were not reduced in proportion to his resources. His intention was, in the first place, to break the Ger man front between Maricourt and Serre. Secondly, to secure the high ground between Ginchy and Bapaume while the French seized its continuation past Sailly and Rancourt. Next, to wheel to the left and roll up the German flank as far as Arras, so widen ing the breach. With this aim all available troops, including the cavalry, would drive northwards from the line Bapaume-Mirau mont while a converging attack was launched in co-operation against the German front south-west of Arras. Fourthly was to come a general advance towards Cambrai-Douai. If the Higher Command did not visualise quite so rapid a break-through as had been expected in 1915, the conception was of an advance immeas urably swifter and deeper than came about.
Topography.—To understand both the problem and course of the battle a brief description of the ground is necessary, for in few battles did topography have so far-reaching an influence and make so deep an impression on the minds of the combatants. Between Ham and Arras the river Somme runs first from south to north as far as Peronne and then bends sharply to the west, on its way to the sea. From Peronne a low range of hills runs somewhat to the north of west, forming the watershed between the Somme and the basins of the Scarpe and the Schelde. This ridge had fallen into German hands in Oct. 1914 in the course of the operations usually described as "the race to the sea" and the line in this quarter, indeed on the whole front from Arras southward to the Oise, had remained substantially unaltered dur ing 1915, the chief change being that in July 1915 a British III. Army had been formed which relieved the French between the Ancre and the Somme. Subsequently a IV. Army was also formed, and early in 1916 the British had relieved the French X. Army
on the Arras front, making their line continuous from Ypres southward. The right boundary between the British and French had varied considerably and in June 1916 was near Maricourt, about 3,00o yd. north of the Somme. Here the Allied line, which southward of this point ran north and south, turned sharply and following the lower slopes of the watershed already described ran west for another 7,000 yd. to make another sharp turn at Fricourt, whence it ran north to and beyond the Ancre, which pierces the ridge between Thiepval and Beaumont Hamel.
German Positions.—The German positions had become ex tremely formidable. Their defenders had been in undisturbed pos session of the high ground for over a year and a half, and since the British had taken over this part of the front the previous autumn, the application of the usual British policy of aggressive trench-warfare had stirred the Germans to strengthen their de fences, to develop artificially the advantage of nature. Woods and villages had become fortresses, two elaborate trench systems had been constructed about two to three miles apart, each con taining several lines and connected up by intermediate lines or "switches" which greatly complicated the task of the attacker who should penetrate any part of the front. Deep "dug-outs," easy to construct in a chalk country, protected the trench garri sons against bombardment, broad belts of barbed wire obstructed the approaches, the lines bristled with well-placed and protected machine-guns, and every point of tactical importance had been specially fortified. The advantage of the ground for observation lay with the Germans. Masefield in his book "The Old Front Line" expressed the situation aptiy : "Almost in every part of this old front our men had to go uphill to attack. . . . The enemy had the look-out posts, with the fine views over France and the scenes of domination. Our men were down below, with no view of any thing but stronghold after stronghold, just up above, being made stronger daily." For an attack on such positions the most elaborate preparations were necessary, both tactical and administrative. Roads and rail ways had to be made, vast dumps of ammunition and stores formed, gun positions selected and dug, bivouacking and encamp ing grounds prepared, the water supply expanded. It was not till the end of June that the offensive could be initiated; and it had been practically impossible to conceal from the Germans the scale and nature of the preparations or the intended extent of the attack. Surprise, difficult in face of such commanding positions, was the more difficult because the art of camouflage and of con cealing preparation was still immature. Had not the vast prepara tions given it away, the fact that the bombardment lasted a week would in any case have announced all but the actual day of the attack.