Battles of the Somme

Dispositions.

The British share of the attack was entrusted to Rawlinson's IV. Army of 17 divisions, of which only two, together with 3 cavalry divisions, were in army reserve. In addi tion a corps of three divisions and the headquarters of a reserve army—under Gough—were placed in the battle area under the hand of the commander-in-chief. Two divisions of the III. Army were to make a subsidiary attack near Gommecourt. The artillery concentration totalled 1,5oo guns, averaging one gun to every 20 yards of front, a record at that time, although far eclipsed later. Rawlinson expressed doubts whether it was sufficient but his suggestion that the frontage should be reduced was not accept able. The bombardment began on June 24, the attack being originally intended for June 29, but subsequently postponed until July 1. This involved not only spreading out the ammunition over a longer period, but a greater strain on the assaulting troops who, after being keyed up for the effort had to remain another 48 hours in cramped trenches, flooded by a torrential downpour, under the din of the bombardment and the enemy's retaliation.

July I, however, dawned dry and with the promise of broiling heat. At 7 A.M. the bombardment rose in intensity and at 7.3o A.M. the British infantry advanced in close-packed waves. These 1916 formations were designed to enable the assaulting infantry to swarm into the opposing trenches as soon as their own guns had lifted. But they exacted a heavier penalty in case of any interval or any insufficiency of the bombardment. And they cramped ini tiative and hindered the infantry taking sensible advantage of cover—for the infantry were taught to advance at a slow walk in strict alignment. Here the penalty was fully exacted by the stout-hearted and skilful German machine-gunners who, shelter ing in dug-outs or shell-holes while the bombardment flattened their trenches, dragged out their weapons and opened fire directly it lifted.

Fricourt, on the right centre, was a turning point not only in the front but in the fortune of the day. All to the north was fail ure, with the heaviest British loss of any day in the war. On the British left the VIII. Corps attacked from Serre to Beaumont Hamel, but though its centre penetrated some way into the Ger man lines north of Beaumont Hamel the flanks were checked and the central division was finally dislodged. Equal ill-success befell the X. Corps and the left division of the III. Corps to the south, in their attacks on the formidable defences of Thiepval and Ovillers. The right division (the 34th) pressed past La Bois selle to Contalmaison but was forced to fall back, its flank being enfiladed from Ovillers. The next corps, the XV., partially achieved its task of pinching out the bastion of Fricourt village and wood. On its north, next the 34th division, the 21st division gained and held a narrow salient, with both its flanks exposed until Fricourt fell next day. On the other side of Fricourt the 7th division and the XIII. corps (18th and 3oth divisions) at tacking in a northerly direction were all successful, taking Ma metz and Montauban. Beyond them, again, the French astride

the Somme fared brilliantly, reaching Hardecourt and Curlu north of the river, while south of it they actually penetrated to and captured six miles of the German second line. They took 6,000 prisoners at little cost.

The Germans had not expected a French attack and were less well prepared on the Fricourt-Montauban front than on the line running north from Fricourt, where both their positions and their fortifications were strongest. The success achieved by the British right and by the French went some way towards compensating for the disastrous failure elsewhere. The Germans could justly claim a victory, for with only six divisions available, and roughly a regiment holding each British division's sector of attack, they had yielded only 1,983 prisoners and a small tract of ground. Yet, although a military failure, July I had proved the moral quality of the new armies of Britain who, in making their heaviest sacri fice of the war, came through the ordeal with courage unshaken and fortitude established. These quondam civilians had borne a percentage of loss such as no professional army of the past had been deemed capable of suffering without being incapable of continued action. For five months more they were to continue.

For, on the morrow Haig, realizing the formidable nature of the frontage astride the Ancre, concentrated his attention on exploiting the success of the right—refusing to accede to Joffre's wish for a renewal of the attack on Thiepval. In the course of 10 days of hard fighting in which some six fresh divisions were thrown into the struggle, La Boisselle, Contalmaison and Ma metz Wood were cleared and the line was advanced on a front of over six miles to within reach of the enemy's second system of defences on the southern crest of the main ridge.

Second Line of Defence Assaulted.

This system, less strong than that stormed on July 1, was formidable enough and the stubborn resistance of the Germans in their front system and inter mediate lines had allowed large reserves of men and guns to be brought up and the defence to be reorganized. If Haig had been unduly ambitious and optimistic before July 14, he now perhaps tended to the other extreme. In contrast the IV. Army com mand held that in bold and rapid measures lay the only chance to forestall the building of freshly fortified systems in the rear. Raw linson framed a plan to attack and break the second system on a four-mile front between Delville Wood and Bazentin-le-Petit Wood. His right was still three-quarters of a mile distant. If the obvious course was followed and an attack delivered only on the left, the prospects were barren. For the experience of 1915 had shown that an attack on a narrow frontage might gain an initial success, only to be "blown" out of the captured fragment of ground by the concentration of enemy gun-fire thus facilitated. Rawlinson proposed to cross the intervening and exposed area on the right under cover of darkness and then to attack along the whole frontage at dawn, preceded by a hurricane bombardment of only a few minutes duration.