PRIMITIVE KNOWLEDGE Reason, the capacity to know, to invent and to evolve theories, has been regarded as the distinctive mark of man, dividing Homo sapiens from other living beings. Perhaps over-confident exaggera tion of this has led to the recent reaction which denies to the primitive mind any power of reasoning and of observation.
But had primitive technique been studied not as a self-contained object, but in its functional dependence upon knowledge on the one hand and magic on the other, the theory of a primitive mystical and prelogical mentality could never have been erected. Primitive man shows a rational behaviour, an unimpeachable logic and a definite power of empirical observation, not only in his technology, but also in his major economic pursuits and in his sociological behaviour.
Language.—This subject has been so far but imperfectly studied by anthropologists, and its cultural theory is as yet hardly outlined. The study of dead languages by grammarians and philologists has caused speech to be regarded as a self-contained phenomenon governed by special laws of its own. It was a con siderable step forward when, some time ago, the study of language was taken up by psychologists, who began to treat it in correla tion with thought and other phenomena (Lazarus, Steinthal, Wundt). The structural features of language were explained as an adequate expression of reasoning, of emotional states, of aesthetic needs and of the characteristics of the human will. Even this, however, is not sufficient.
Recent developments in linguistics, as well as in the philosophy of language, have set forth the view that language cannot at any stage of development be regarded as an adequate expression of logical, metaphysical, aesthetic or scientific categories (J. Dewey, Jespersen, Ogden and Richards). Language, in all societies and at all stages of development, is an essential part of human action (Dewey). Communication by spoken word is indispensable for any concerted activity and enters into all aspects of culture as a working element. (See LANGUAGE.) From the functional point of view, a word which designates an implement is as much an essential manner of using that imple ment as is any type of bodily skill required to handle it. The master of a craft, however primitive, must be able to give his orders in case of emergency in a technically adequate and theo retically correct manner, and the bodily reactions of his vocal apparatus are as essential to the practical issue as the manual dexterity of his crew. Language plays a similar part in warfare,
in economic pursuits, in ceremonial activities. In religious and magical ritual, the spoken word is conceived and felt by man to be a creative act which produces a definite practical effect.
But if speech, in its primitive forms, is an indispensable instru ment of cultural behaviour, its structure must be correlated to pragmatic needs and to the requirements of action rather than to logical, reflective or oratorical necessities. Hence the categories of primitive speech must be a compromise between rational and logical conditions, sociological and practical needs, and certain limitations imposed by material culture.
The problem of meaning cannot be treated by the study of language, torn out of its cultural context. The classical philolo gist has already summoned the archaeologist to his assistance. The study of living languages of the primitive type, helped out by the study of living cultures, would, no doubt, reveal to us infinitely more than can be reached by the study of dead speech. A word is as sterile without the knowledge of how it is used in live context, as behaviour remains mysterious without its accom panying flow of speech.. Life is neither verbiage nor a pantomime. Speech has been given man fc r action, and as mere loquacity it is a disease of culture. (See PHILOLOGY.) Mythology as Primitive Science. (See MYTHoLoGY.)—In order to vindicate the autonomy of knowledge within primitive culture, it is still necessary to deal with the view that, at low levels of culture, myth is a substitute for science. We read in the authoritative handbook already mentioned : Myths are stories which, however marvellous and improbable to us, are nevertheless related in all good faith, because they are intended or believed by the teller, to explain by means of some thing concrete and intelligible, an abstract idea, or such vague and difficult conceptions as creation, death, distinctions of race or animal species, the different occupations of men and women; the origins of rites and customs, or striking natural objects or pre historic monuments; the meaning of the names of persons and places. Such stories are sometimes described as aetiological, because their purpose is to explain why something exists or happens (Notes and Queries, pp. 2I0 and 2 I I).