However, such is the power of words that in the eyes of a certain number of delegates, a great many difficulties raised by the study of Article 16 of the Covenant regarding the measures to be taken in the event of aggression were removed by the initiative of the Belgian delegate M. de Brouckere, who proposed to substitute in its place the study of the application of Article I I regarding the measures to be taken in the event of the threat of war.
The economic sanctions were also the cause of serious delibera tions. The abstention of the United States, the greatest economic Power in the world, weighed heavily upon these negotiations; especially the proposal for a peaceful blockade of the aggressor State of a nature to awaken the susceptibilities of the American Government, always alert in matters of this kind.
As to the military measures, Briand and Chamberlain, faced with the difficulties of applying these, caused their examination to be deferred until the next Assembly of the League of Nations which was to meet in Sept. 1927.
When, at that date, at Geneva, the Assembly had to make decisions, it defined its ideas and took practical measures with a view to facilitating arbitration and the reduction of armaments.
The rapporteur, M. de Brouckere—struck once more with the close tie existing between security and the limitation of arma ments—declared plainly that it was useless to bring together the Disarmament Conference so long as the preparatory technical work was not finished. He proposed that the preparatory com mission of this conference should name a committee of Arbitra tion and Security which should pursue its study parallel with the other preparatory body, and in close co-operation with it.
In the course of the discussions of the preparatory commission, the distinctive attitude of some of its members was noticed. The German delegates, through Count Bernstorff, insisted on the meeting of the Disarmament Conference to discuss only present conditions of security. That would have been to separate com pletely the two questions, contrary to the text of the Covenant, and to the obvious wish of the League of Nations. On the other hand, M. Litvinof and M. Lunacharski, of the Soviet Delegation, lodged a proposal aiming at the general and complete disarmament of all nations. They demanded the complete and immediate abolition of all military, naval and aerial forces, the destruction of fortresses and naval bases, the suppression of all military legis lation, of all service—compulsory or voluntary—and the pro hibition of all military education of the young.
was presented and discussed at the second meeting of the com mittee which took place at Geneva from Feb. 20 to March 7, 1928. Politis dismissed as at present unrealizable the idea of a general agreement, adding to the obligations of the Covenant, and recommended the conclusion of regional agreements (par ticular or collective) of non-aggression, of arbitration or of mutual assistance, or of non-aggression only. These regional pacts were always to include the renunciation of recourse to force, the organization of pacific procedure for the settlement of all differ ences, and the establishment of a system of mutual assistance consistent with the principles of the League of Nations. These pacts, in case of war, would enable the Council to name the aggressor, and to exercise the right of prescribing armistice. The connection between security and disarmament could be stipulated, and the Council of the League of Nations could co-ordinate the different regional pacts as between each other and in relation to the Covenant of the League.
After this report, a drafting committee was charged by the Arbitration and Security Committee with preparing a certain number of model treaties of conciliation, arbitration, non-aggres sion, and mutual assistance. M. Rolin-Jaequemyns, the Belgian delegate, was charged with reporting upon them to the third meeting of the committee which took place from June 27 to July 4, 1928. Certain delegates were led to make some reserva tions upon the conclusions submitted to them. It was thus that the Yugoslav delegate asked for the insertion of a clause directed against flagrant aggression, and the question of the territorial status quo was raised by the representative of Poland; but the most remarkable suggestions came from the German delegates. They demanded that in the event of international conflicts the measures to be taken by the Council of the League of Nations should be determined by a majority vote, and not by a unanimous vote. If there were danger of war, the German delegates pro posed that the normal peace time military establishment should be re-established, and that if hostilities had broken out there should be an armistice and a withdrawal of the troops that had penetrated into foreign territory. These proposals were worthy of attention. but they could only be efficacious, if they were subject to rapid control and organized beforehand. That is what the French delegate, Paul-Boncour, demanded, and in so doing came into opposition with the Italian and Japanese delegates. Lord Cushendun, for his part, rejected in the name of the British Government the greater part of the German suggestions.