Serbian Campaigns

SERBIAN CAMPAIGNS The 1914 opera tions and the conquest of Serbia in 1915 are described below, while an account is given of the Allied operations in Macedonia, 1915-8, and of the reconquest of Serbia, under the heading SALONIKA CAMPAIGNS.

The

Austro-Hungarian problem in starting a campaign against Serbia was complicated by the prospect of Russian intervention in Galicia; the Austrian staff had, accordingly, drawn up two plans of concentration.

Alternative Austro-Hungarian Plans.

The first plan, in . case of war against Serbia and Montenegro, called Concentration B (Balkan), involved the employment of seven corps. The second plan, in case of war with Russia and Serbia, called Concentration R (Russia), involved the employment against Russia of nine corps; against Serbia and Montenegro of a minimum group of three corps and the formation of a reserve (four corps) which could be directed as required towards the Russian frontier or those of Serbia and Montenegro.

Convinced at first that they would have to deal only with the southern Slays, Austria-Hungary ordered, on July 26, the partial mobilization required for Concentration B; but, owing to corn plications with Russia, general mobilization was proclaimed on July 31. To avoid confusion, the Austro-Hungarian staff decided to allow Concentration B to be completed before withdrawing the reserve provided for in plan R.

Serbian Mobilization.

The Serbian general mobilization, ordered on July 25, yielded 490,000 men at the outset, and some 43,00o more between August and September. Montenegro de clared war on Austria-Hungary on Aug. 5, 1914. Her forces amounted to about 50,000 militia with very little artillery, and were of no direct assistance to Serbia, though they occupied the attention of three Austrian mountain brigades. Circumstances compelled Serbia to adopt a purely defensive strategy. Her army, commanded by the Crown Prince Alexander, with Voivode Putnik as chief of staff, was therefore concentrated in a central position enabling it to operate either towards the Sava and Danube or towards the Drina.

After the withdrawal according to Concentration R of the Austrian II. Army, the Serbs had a superiority not only in num bers but also in quality, 90% of them having fought in the 1912-13 wars, and three-quarters of their guns being better than the Austrians'. On the other hand, Austria's equipment and resources in ammunition were far superior.

Jadar Operations, and Cer Battle: Aug. 16-24.—North Serbia is a mountainous country, devoid of good communications, particularly in the northwest, whilst the actual frontier was formed on the north by the formidable obstacle of the Danube and Sava, on the west by the Drina, a river not very broad but swift and difficult to bridge. The plan for the invasion of Serbia, drawn up by Conrad von Hotzendorff and Moltke in consulta tion, involved a concentric advance from all fronts, but was vitiated by the withdrawal of the II. Army. Potiorek, however, who feared an advance of the Serbs over the Drina to excite insurrection among their kinsmen in Bosnia, launched, on his own responsibility, a preventive offensive.

On the night of Aug. 11-12, the Austrian V. Army (VIII. and XIII. Corps) and elements of IV. and IX. Corps from the II. Army began to cross on a wide front from Drenovac on the Sava to Ljubovija on the Middle Drina, successfully driving back the Serbian frontier detachments. The Serbians moved to oppose the enemy, and by the evening of the 15th their II. Army occu pied positions on a line south of Sabac, across the Cer and Iverak ridges and the Jadar valley, connecting with their III. Army who had moved forward from Valjevo to Zavlaka and Krupanj. Their I. Army had taken over the whole northern front as far as Obrenovac.

On the i6th, after severe fighting, the Austrian XIII. Corps drove back the left and centre of the Serbian III. Army, cap turing Krupanj and threatening the Valjevo-OseEina road behind the Serbian positions. On the right of the II. Army the Serbs were also forced to give way, but in the centre a local counter attack secured for the Serbs the important position of Kosanin grad (Aug. 18). This enabled the II. Army Commander Stepa novie, to launch on the 19th a counter-stroke along the Cer and Iverak ridges, which swept the Austrian VIII. Corps down in and over the Drina. The Austrian right wing (VI. Army), which had concentrated around Vingrad, less hard pressed, and better organ ized for mountain warfare, retired in good order, but by the 22nd the whole river front was again occupied by the Serbs. The Austrian II. Army fared no better, losing prisoners and guns in their retreat over the Sava.